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Abstract 
 
Michael E. Porter’s Diamond framework has been used as an analysis tool the last 15 years to 
define the competitive advantage of nations, but few researchers have discussed if there is a 
link between the Diamond framework and how international firms can pursue the best entry 
mode. Different variables will be presented linking the Diamond framework to entry 
strategies, designing an extended framework. Three case scenarios are used for analysis 
purposes; the first two originating in Porter’s Diamond framework, while the third deals with 
alternative theory to the Diamond framework. The first scenario takes place in a nation where 
the home market lacks one or more of the Diamond determinants. The firm in this scenario is 
IKEA. The second scenario is located in a nation where the home market accesses all the 
Diamond-determinants. The firm chosen for this scenario is the Lerøy Seafood Group. The 
development of an extended framework illustrates how Porter’s Diamond better suits the 
current business formation. Born Globals and the Double Diamond framework are presented 
as alternative notions for analysis-purposes. To illustrate the concepts, Dell Computer 
Corporation has been chosen.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The internationalization process can be viewed in stages from the acknowledgement of the 
needs and wishes for international business, via the crucial foreign market entry phase to the 
point where the firm starts competing and consolidates in distant markets.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to connect Porter’s Diamond framework of competitive 
advantage of nations to entry strategies. More specific, the scope of the thesis is firms 
originating in sophisticated and advanced market economies establishing in other advanced 
market economies. This means the challenges of entering into emerging and undeveloped 
economies will not be dealt with. In order to do so, an extended framework is developed and 
tested on two different case-scenarios. In addition, a third scenario is used for testing the 
validity of alternative concepts which can be seen as criticism of the Diamond-framework.  
 
A clarification on the time perspective of the thesis is required. When focusing on the entry 
strategy phase, the association may be drawn towards the initial international experience of 
the firm. This, however, is not the approach in this thesis. The firms used for analysis have 
constantly continued expanding into new markets after their initial internationalization. 
Therefore, when dealing with the entry phase in this thesis, the notion is to be interpreted as a 
new entry strategy process for each new market entry.  
 
The thesis is divided into three main parts. Part one constitutes of the theory part, where the 
research on which the thesis rests upon is being presented. In part two, the main task is the 
development of the Extended framework and the connection between Porter’s Diamond and 
entry strategies. The last part includes the testing of the Extended framework on two different 
business-contexts. The first scenario describes a context where one or more of the country-
specific determinants of the Diamond framework are lacking in the home-base. The second 
scenario illustrates the context where the home-market possesses all the determinants itself. 
The third scenario, however, has another focus than the two others. Scenario 1 and 2 focus on 
connecting the Diamond framework to entry strategies, while scenario 3 illustrates a business 
context where the Diamond is not relevant. The case-scenario firms are IKEA (Sweden), the 
Lerøy Seafood Group (Norway) and Dell Computer Corporation (the USA).  
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Peng (2006) points out three crucial questions which need to be answered. These are how to 
enter a new market, when to enter and where to enter. In addition, a why question is added 
because of the necessity to define a reason for the internationalization-process. The how 
question relates to the different entry strategies, like export, franchising, FDI, JV and others, 
while the when question deals with the time aspect.  Finally, where refers to the choice of 
location for the foreign subsidiary.  
 
Although the main focus lies with the how question, the extended framework and the 
connection to entry strategies are found by also investigating the why and the where question. 
 
1.1 Definitions  
 
The focus of the thesis is limited to advanced economies. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) the term advanced economy is replacing the old terms of industrial 
countries to describe the level of economic prosperity and wealth, as the share of employment 
in manufacturing is declining among the world’s leading economies. The characteristics of 
advanced economies are “per capita income levels well within the range indicated by the 
group of industrial countries, well-developed financial markets and high degrees of financial 
intermediation, and diversified economic structures with relatively large and rapidly growing 
service sectors.”(www.imf.org). 
 
The terms “going international” and “going global” are often used interchangeable in the 
international business literature, see Peng (2006), Gooderham and Nordhaug (2004) among 
others. In this thesis the term “going international” refers to a firm establishing business 
outside its home market. The term “going global”, i.e. to engage in a global strategy, is “A 
particular form of international strategy, characterized by the production and distribution of 
standardized products and services on a worldwide basis” (Peng, 2006). Throughout the 
thesis, the term “going international” is preferred because the Extended framework should not 
be limited by the more narrow definition of “going global”.  
 
The firms used in the analysis, can all be classified as Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2004) define MNEs by two criteria: The first relates to the need for 
HQs to engage in the active management of their overseas subsidiaries, not only holding them 
as a passive financial portfolio. More specific, what Bartlett and Ghoshal want, is to 
distinguish the pure holding corporations, as these cannot be regarded as real MNEs. The 
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second criterion is regarding the need for substantial foreign direct investment. Substantial 
direct investment can be explained as “A flow of lending to, or purchase of ownership in, a 
foreign enterprise that is largely owned (at least 10 percent ownership, according to U.S. 
balance of payments accounts) by residents of the investing country. Direct investment 
implies full or partial control of the enterprise and, usually, physical presence by foreign firms 
or individuals in the host country” (www.highered.mcgraw-hill.com). Among the firms which 
can be classified as an MNE, those with less than 250 employees in a European context and 
less than 500 employees in an American context can be classified as Small-and-Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs).1
 
In the third scenario, e-commerce is being discussed. Parsons and Oja (2006) define e-
commerce as “financial transactions that are conducted electronically over a computer 
network. It encompasses all aspects of business and marketing processes enabled by internet 
and web technologies.” 
 
 
1 This definition is taken from the work of Servais, Per, Rasmussen Erik S, Nielsen Bo B, & Madsen, Tage K.. In 
addition to use number of employees as defining measurement of the MNEs, turnover or the size of the balance 
sheet may also be used.  
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PART ONE 
 
THEORY 
 
II. Methodology 
 
The thesis is based on a qualitative methodology. The Extended framework is theoretically 
derived, and the research used for the framework development, is articles and textbooks. 
 
2.1 Sources 
 
The bibliographical search was done using bibliographical databases, specialized research 
databases and relevant websites on the three firms and their industries. All sources were 
accessed through the library at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administrations (NHH) in Bergen, Norway, during the time period of Sept. 2005 – Feb. 2006. 
The searches included general bibliographical databases such as BIBSYS and Google 
Scholars, and research databases like Business Source Premier, Business Source Complete 
from EBSCO (NHH accessed this database shortly before the deadline) and Science Direct. 
BIBSYS were mostly used for textbook searches, while the other databases mainly were used 
for finding articles. Among the most frequently used websites were http://www.godfisk.no, 
http://www.leroy.no, http://www.ikea.com and http://www.dell.com.  
 
The searches were carried out using key words as “entry strategies”, “entry modes” and 
“Diamond-framework + Porter”. In addition, direct searches on author or journal also took 
place, mainly on Porter, Michael, Bartlett and Ghoshal, Management International Review 
(MIR) and Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS). From the start searches were 
limited to research published from 2000 and later, but as the results were not satisfactory, the 
searches continued without any restrictions on publishing dates. The searches were limited to 
include only English and Norwegian literature.  
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2.2 The Outcome of the Bibliographical Search and the Application of Sources 
 
The outcome of the literature search comprised approximately 250 titles using the Business 
Source Premier, but broadened to roughly 400 titles using both the Business Source Premier 
and the Business Source Complete databases. The selection of articles was rather limited as 
the thesis concentrates on advanced economies both as home-markets and host-country 
markets. The limitation actually more than halved the outcome of the search because a great 
number of articles are focusing on entry into emerging economies, in particular the Asian 
economies, with China and South Korea as the most cited, and many of the former 
Communist states in Eastern Europe. The search outcome was further narrowed by the fact 
that several of the remaining articles either originated from non-academic journals or had a 
distinct marketing approach, which were considered as not suitable for the purpose of the 
thesis. 
 
Another problem with the database-searches was that a number of articles had a very specific 
purpose; typically examining how one particular entry strategy would match one certain 
industry, while the extended framework presented later in the thesis is developed for more 
general purposes. Finally, 6-7 articles were actively used.  
 
Because of the relatively few suitable articles, several textbooks have been used to 
complement the literature sources. Textbooks have also been used for definitions and to form 
the basis of the presentation of theory and frameworks which provide the basis for discussions 
and the development of the extended framework later in the thesis. Most of the articles were 
used for determining the connection between the Diamond-framework and entry strategies, 
and hence, as the basis for the extended framework. It is the connection which is the 
contribution to this thesis; hence, most effort has been put in the search for relevant articles 
for this purpose.  
 
The literature on the Born Global Concept (2 articles) were accessed through direct 
correspondence with the authors at the University of Southern Denmark.  
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III. Motivations for Going International 
 
Having outlined the methodology, the focus now turns to the presentation of the theoretical 
basis for the thesis, starting with the reasons for going international.  
 
Although the main objective is to explore the how-question, it may be reasonable that the 
answer is found by also examining the why-question. Without a proper and inspiring 
motivation, it is doubtful that firms will engage in the complex and time-consuming process 
of planning an international launch, and therefore, have to consider which entry strategy to 
follow.  
 
Through search of literature, it became evident that different scholars introduce different sets 
of motivations2. The presentation given in this thesis is based on Lasserre’s (2003) 
contribution in his textbook Global Strategic Management, where he gives a simple, but 
including categorization. Furthermore, he also makes an effort connecting the motivations to 
the entry strategies, see appendix 1. This connection is used later in the thesis when 
developing the Extended framework.  
 
Lasserre (2003) mentions four general categories of motivations: 
 
1. To develop the market 
Firms having market development objectives typically look for countries representing size 
and growth opportunities. Favourable countries are those that are critical regarding size 
and quality of their customer base, i.e. countries that can offer a large home markets with 
growth potential, and/or a very demanding and quality minded customer base. Such 
countries are often referred to as key countries, and a presence is often required for a long 
term global competitiveness. Key countries commonly mentioned are the US, China, 
Japan, United Kingdom, France and Germany. Russia should probably also be added to 
that list soon. Market development and market share increase constitute the most common 
entry objectives.  
 
 
2See for instance Kotabe and Helsen 2001 
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2. To access critical resources 
The assumption is that certain key resources; mineral, agricultural or human, needed for 
developing competitive advantage, are found in other areas than the home-market. A 
presence in a resource-rich country will essentially be made to secure a steady supply of 
the key resource. Such activity can be the establishment of a mine, a plant, a software 
centre, a research facility etc.  
 
3. To capture knowledge available in the country 
Learning objectives and investment in knowledge and research is important in countries 
where the particular industry is leading when it comes to innovation, product development 
and R&D, and where the only way to gain these competencies, is by being present.  
 
4. To set up a regional or global centre for co-ordinating various activities 
Countries chosen for co-ordination activities have a critical geographical position and 
superior infrastructure to the surrounding areas. Often, firms tend to locate their 
HQs/training centres/logistics centres in such countries.  
 
IV. The Competitive Advantage of Nations 
 
The task of this chapter is to give a thorough presentation of Porter’s work on competitive 
advantage of nations and the Diamond framework. The Diamond framework and the theory of 
the competitive advantage of nations are important contributions to the theoretical foundation 
of the thesis, and hence, a great effort has been put into this presentation, drawing upon the 
work of Porter himself.   
 
Central in Porter’s research on the competitive advantage of nations, is his statement that 
“national prosperity is created, not inherited.” (Porter, 1990). By saying this, he rejects the 
traditional economic theory which teaches that variables like labour costs, interest rates and 
economy of scale are of most importance for the competitive advantages of a nation3. These 
are often a result of historical events and traditions, i.e. inherited.  
 
In order to do so, several premises for understanding national advantage are given. First, the 
reason why some firms are better at differentiating between products and sources of 
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competitive advantage needs to be explored. Second, an explanation of why the nation 
appears to be the desirable home base for competing in an industry should be given.  
 
Porter defines the home base as the location “where strategy is set, core product and process 
development takes place, and the essential and proprietary skills reside.” (Porter, 1998b) The 
home base then constitutes the platform for a global strategy in which advantages drawn from 
the home nation are supplemented by those of the firm. Third, firms gain and sustain 
competitive advantage in international competition through improvement, innovation and 
upgrading. Porter (1990) defines innovation very broadly to include both product 
improvement and development of entirely new products and production methods. 
Furthermore, he stresses the importance of innovation as an accumulation of small steps and 
extended efforts, as much as the dramatic breakthrough. Advantages are gained through 
altering the basis of competition, and sustained by improvement which is fast enough to stay 
ahead. Today’s advantages are soon superseded or nullified. At the core of explaining national 
advantage in an industry must be the role of the home nation stimulating competitive 
improvement and innovation. Finally, the firms gaining competitive advantage are not 
necessarily those which discover new market needs or the potential of new technologies, but 
the early-movers and those most aggressive towards exploring new opportunities. Such new 
discoveries may alter the competitive structure of an industry, making previous leaders minor 
to the more adapting firms.  
 
4.1 The Diamond of National Advantage 
 
The Diamond framework is an industry-level framework focusing on the nations as its core 
unit of analysis. It is a tool for determining whether the industry (in a given nation) can 
provide firms with such favourable conditions allowing them to compete internationally. In 
other words, the Diamond framework says whether or not a firm has the competitive 
advantages necessary for an international launching.   
 
The Diamond framework consists of four country-specific determinants, which describe 
characteristics of a nation’s competitive advantage, and two external variables. The 
determinants are factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry, chance and government. The determinants as a system 
constitute the Diamond framework, which is a mutually reinforced system meaning that the 
 
3 See the classical work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo among others.  
effect of one determinant depends on the state of the others. Porter (1990) points out two 
elements of particular importance for the diamond as a system: domestic rivalry and 
geographic concentration. Domestic rivalry can be seen as the main motivator for 
improvement in all the other determinants, whereas geographic concentration is important 
because it expands and promotes the interaction among the determinants.  
 
The determinants, individually and as a system, create the context in which a nation’s firms 
are born and compete: “the availability of resources and skills necessary for competitive 
advantage in an industry; the information that shapes what opportunities are perceived and the 
directions in which resources and skills are deployed; the goals of the owners, managers, and 
employees that are involved in or carry out competition; and most importantly, the pressure 
on firms to invest and innovate.” (Porter, 1998b). In other words, nations succeed in particular 
industries because their home environment is the most dynamic and the most challenging.  
This environment stimulates firms to upgrade and widen their advantages over time, for 
instance where the national diamond is the most favourable. The companies that emerge from 
such an environment will flourish in international competition.  
 
Demand 
Conditions 
Factor 
Conditions 
Related and 
Supporting 
Industries 
Firm Strategy, 
Structure, 
 and Rivalry 
Chance 
Govern-
ment 
 
 
The Determinants of National Competitive Advantage    Source: Porter, 1990 
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To achieve and sustain competitive success in the knowledge-intensive industries of advanced 
economies, it is necessary that advantages are sourced throughout the diamond. Although, 
advantage in every determinant is not a prerequisite for competitive advantage in an industry, 
but competitive advantage should be based on more than only one or two determinants. The 
interaction of advantage in many determinants creates self-reinforcing benefits that are 
extremely hard for foreign rivals to nullify or replicate.  
 
The Diamond framework states that firms gain competitive advantage under three conditions: 
¾ If home base allows accumulation of assets and skills 
¾ In industries where home base affords better information and insight into product and 
process needs 
¾ If goals of the owners, managers and employees support intense commitment and 
sustained investment  
 
4.1.1 Factor Conditions 
 
Factor conditions relates to the nation’s position in factors of production, such as skilled 
labour or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry. 
 
Factors of production can be ranged in a hierarchy where basic and generalized factors (local 
raw materials, unskilled labour etc) constitute the lowest level, and advanced and specialized 
factors (highly educated and specialized labour and other factors that in particular meet the 
needs of the industry) are on the higher level. Porter (1990) stresses the advanced and 
specialized factors as those critical for sustained and heavy investment. He even argues that 
having general high school or college/university education does not necessarily represent 
competitive advantage in the modern international competition. What is important to create 
competitive advantages, are factors highly specialized to an industry’s particular needs, like 
venture capital in Silicon Valley and scientific research facilities in the aircraft-industry. 
These factors are scarce and hard to imitate, and they require sustained investment to be 
created.  
 
In other words, what is important in sophisticated industries and advances economies is not 
the stock of factors itself, but how it most efficiently can be created, upgraded and deployed 
into particular industries. Usually, competitive advantage results from the presence of leading 
institutions that first create specialized factors and then continually work to upgrade them. 
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The driving force behind this innovative process is active domestic rivals which create 
pressure and company goals leading towards constant commitment to the industry. It is 
essential for companies to positioning themselves in the market, to innovate and upgrade 
before foreign rivals. In order to do this, favourable conditions must be present elsewhere in 
the diamond.  
 
4.1.2 Demand Conditions 
 
Demand conditions relates to the nature of home-market demand for the industry’s products 
or services.  
 
Porter (1998b) states that nations gain competitive advantage in industries where the home 
demand gives their companies a clearer and/or earlier picture of emerging buyer needs. Such 
home bases are often characterized by having some of the world’s most sophisticated and 
demanding buyers for the product or service. This is the reason why sophisticated demand 
conditions provide advantages, because firms are forced to respond to tough challenges by 
innovating and upgrading sooner than its foreign competitors. However, the size of the home 
demand proves less significant than the character of home demand.  
 
However, sophisticated demand conditions in the home market are of little value if domestic 
preferences are not transferable to other nations. A nation’s companies can anticipate global 
trends only if the nation’s values are spreading. Nations export their values and tastes through 
media, through training foreigners, through political influence, and through the foreign 
activities of their citizens and companies. Transfering domestic preferences to foreign 
markets, do not only benefit market growth in general, but is most important for small, open 
economies whose home market is too small to secure a high growth rate.  
 
4.1.3 Related and Supporting Industries 
 
Related and supporting industries relate to the presence or absence in the nation of supplier 
industries and other related industries that are internationally competitive.  
 
Internationally competitive home-based suppliers create advantages in downstream industries 
in several ways, such as the ability to offer the most cost-effective input delivery and close 
 17
working relationships. Short lines of communication can improve the information flow and 
the exchange of ideas and innovations due to a quick and constant process.  
 
The nation’s companies benefit most when the suppliers themselves are global competitors. It 
is ineffective for a company to create suppliers that are totally dependent on the domestic 
industry and in the worst case, also prevented from serving foreign competitors. The same 
principle applies to suppliers and their recipient firms. As for firms and their customers, 
suppliers also need rivalry and the constant pressure for product innovation and better 
logistics to perform better. Besides, serving only one industry or one market, makes them 
very vulnerable for economic fluctuations, meaning that risk involved is much higher than 
would be the case with a broader customer base.  
 
Home-based competitiveness in related industries provides similar benefits as with suppliers, 
where information flows and technical interchange speed the rate of innovation and 
upgrading.  
 
4.1.4 Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
 
Firm strategy, structure and rivalry constitutes the context in which firms are created, 
organized and managed as well as the nature of domestic rivalry. Goals of the owners, 
management and employees also play a significant role.  
 
The business context varies widely among nations, and national advantage arises from good 
match between choices regarding the context and the sources of competitive advantage in a 
particular industry.  
 
No managerial style can be completely linked to a nation, but national preferences are often of 
such a character that it is noticeable by any observer. Porter (1998b) uses Germany to 
illustrate how the engineering and technical background of many senior executives has 
produced a strong fascination toward methodical product and process improvement. Likewise, 
their organizations are often hierarchical and impersonal. This has led to a great success in 
industries with a high technical or engineering content, whereas German successful firms in 
consumer goods and services are rarer.  
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Nations also differ remarkably in the types of goals that firms and individuals seek to achieve. 
Company goals reflect the national characteristics of capital markets and the 
shareholder/stakeholder issue. They also reflect how managers are being compensated. The 
characteristics of the appraisal systems most commonly accepted, are also important to 
competitive advantage as it influences individual motivation to work and expand skills. 
Individuals, no matter what level or position, should be encouraged to maintain and expand 
their skills and competencies. Outstanding talent is a scarce resource in any nation, and it is 
up to each nation to catch those talented individuals before someone else does. This is 
important because a nation’s success largely depends on which type of education these talents 
pursue, where they choose to work and their commitment and effort in their vacancies. Other 
important nation-variables are attitude towards individualism, equality, inherited status vs. 
achieved status etc.4  
 
Finally, domestic rivalry is a powerful stimulus to the creation and persistence of competitive 
advantage. Domestic rivalry is so important because of the mutual pressure for improvement 
and innovation. Porter (1998b) argues that the rivalry among domestic firms often go beyond 
a pure price-war, they push each other for better quality and services and the creation of new 
products and processes. The competition may reach a point where the incumbent firms might 
not preserve advantages for long periods, but the active pressure from its competitors and the 
fear of falling behind stimulates to new thinking and innovation.  
 
4.1.5 The Two External Determinants; Chance and Government 
 
The two external variables in the Diamond framework are chance and government. 
Chance events are developments outside the control of firms (and usually also the nation’s 
government), such as pure inventions, wars, external political developments, major shifts in 
foreign market demand, breakthrough in basic technologies etc. They create discontinuities 
that can reshape industry structure and provide the opportunity for one nation’s firms to 
supplant another’s.   
 
4 Porter (1998) mentions in his book a lot of nation-dependent aspects influencing the ways in which firms are 
organized and managed. Many of these aspects are similar to the issues dealt with in the cultural dimensions of 
scholars like Hofsteede and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, for an introduction to both frameworks, see 
Trompenaars, Fons / Hampden-Turner, Charles: Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity 
in Global Business, 2nd ed, McGraw Hill, New York 1998 
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The final determinant to complete the Diamond-framework is Government. Government, at 
all levels, can make decisions which either can improve or worsen the national advantage.  
This is most clearly seen by examining how policies can influence each of the determinants. 
Antitrust policy, regulations, investment and attitude towards education and government 
purchases all influences the diamond in one way or another. If such governmental policies are 
implemented without careful consideration on how they influence the diamond, the result may 
be undermining the competitive advantage as well enhancing it.   
 
4.2 Cluster Discussion 
 
As stated above, domestic rivalry and innovation is crucial for a good business performance, 
and clusters are special locations which can offer some of the best suitable business 
environments for their incumbent firms. As a continuation of the Diamond introduction, a 
brief presentation of cluster follows.  
 
Porter (1998a) defines clusters as “critical masses - in one place - of unusual competitive 
success in particular fields”. In more detail, it is geographic concentrations of interconnected 
companies and institutions in a particular field. It encompasses an array of linked industries 
and other entities important to competition, and affects competitiveness within countries as 
well as across national borders. Often clusters also extend downstream to channels and 
customers, to manufacturers of complementary products and to companies in industries 
related to skills, technologies, or common inputs. Many clusters also include governmental 
and other institutions.  
 
Most important of all, clusters promote both competition and cooperation (Porter, 1998a). 
Rivals compete intensely to win and retain customers. Without such dynamic competition, a 
cluster will fail. There is also cooperation, much of it vertical, involving companies in related 
industries and local institutions. Clusters represent a kind of new organizational form in 
between geographical close markets on the one hand and hierarchies, or vertical integration, 
on the other. A cluster, then, is an alternative way of organizing the value chain (Porter, 
1998a)  
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4.2.1 Clusters and Motivations 
 
Clusters in the meaning of vertical integration apply in particular to co-ordination, as logistics 
within the cluster area become a way of achieving competitive advantage. It will be essential 
to plan how the set of base for global and regional development should be, including the 
establishment of logistic centers. A set up base close to financing institutions will facilitate 
the coordination of cluster members, where speed and control will be improved. 
 
However, clusters may be critical to competition for several reasons because productivity 
rests on how companies compete, not on the particular fields they compete in. Companies can 
be highly productive in any industry if they employ sophisticated methods, use advanced 
technology, and offer unique products and services. All industries can employ advanced 
technology and all industries can be knowledge intensive. The sophistication with which 
companies compete in a particular location, however, is strongly influenced by the quality of 
the local business environment. The Diamond framework stresses how the relations among 
the determinants create business formation, where clusters affect competition in three broad 
ways:  
 
¾ By increasing the productivity of companies based in the area 
¾ By driving the direction and speed of innovation, which underpins future productivity 
growth 
¾ By stimulating the formation of new business, which expands and strengthens the 
cluster itself. 
 
The cluster-advantages can be summarized broadly as influencing productivity in a positive 
manner. Being part of a cluster allows companies to operate more productively in sourcing 
inputs; accessing information, technology, and needed institutions; coordinating with related 
companies; and measuring and motivating improvement. 
 
Better access to employees and suppliers: Companies in vibrant clusters can tap into an 
existing pool of specialized and experienced employees, thereby lowering their search and 
transaction costs in recruiting. Because a cluster signals opportunity and reduces the risk of 
relocation for employees, it can also be easier to attract talented people from other locations, a 
decisive advantage in some industries. Sourcing locally instead of from distant suppliers will 
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lower transaction costs, whereas formal alliances with distant suppliers can moderate some of 
the disadvantages of distant outsourcing. Even when some inputs are best sourced from a 
distance, clusters offer advantages. Suppliers trying to enter a large, concentrated market will 
price more aggressively. 
 
The access to critical resources will therefore be a crucial motivation for firms to be a part of 
a cluster because it will secure the steady supply of the critical resources, including the 
advantages of better access to skilled low-cost labour, natural resources and suppliers. 
 
Access to specialized information: In the extensive market, technical and competitive 
information accumulates within a cluster, and members have preferred access to it. 
Additionally, personal relationships and communities within the cluster will contribute to 
further trust and facilitate the flow of information, resulting in a more transferable information 
flow. This is in accordance to the learning motivation. To achieve this goal, firms will be 
totally dependent on being present in the host country. This view is also supported by Ellis 
(2000), where he states that social ties will be an important factor when entering a foreign 
market. It signals the firm’s intent to keep key competitors and determines the basis for future 
battles. How decision-makers identify potential exchange partners in foreign markets and thus 
initiate international exchange relationships is essential. 
 
Access to institutions and public goods: Investments made by government or other public 
institutions can enhance a company’s productivity (public spending for specialized 
infrastructure or educational programs). But also investments done by companies contribute 
to increased productivity (training programs, infrastructure, and quality centers). 
 
Better motivation and measurement: Local rivalry is highly motivating and clusters can 
also make it easier to measure and compare performances because local rivals share general 
conditions. Companies within clusters have intimate knowledge of their suppliers’ costs, and 
managers will have the possibility to compare costs and employees performance. Clusters are 
conductive to new business formations for many different reasons. Individuals working within 
a cluster can more easily distinguish gaps in products or services around which they can build 
businesses. Barriers to entry are usually lower than outside clusters. 
 
Clusters may play a crucial role in a company’s ongoing ability to innovate. Because 
sophisticated buyers are often part of a cluster, companies inside clusters usually have a better 
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insight in the market than isolated competitors do. In addition to enhance innovation, clusters 
provide the capacity and the flexibility to act rapidly. A company relying on distant suppliers 
faces greater challenges in every activity it coordinates with other organizations, and 
innovation can be even harder in vertically integrated companies. Reinforcing the other 
advantages for innovation is the vertical pressure, competitive pressure and the constant 
assessment that occurs in a cluster. 
 
The market development motivation will help firms through innovation finding new markets 
with growth potential and good customer base. Complementarities will also be a good 
motivational factor in a market development situation.  Because members of the cluster are 
mutually dependent, good performance by one can boost the success of the others. The most 
obvious complementarities are when products complement one another in meeting customer’s 
needs. Another form is the coordination of activities across companies to optimize their 
collective productivity. Other complementarities arise in marketing. A cluster frequently 
enhances the reputation of a location in a particular field, making it more likely that buyers 
will turn to a seller based there. Beyond reputation cluster members often profit from a variety 
of joint marketing mechanisms, such as company referrals, trade fairs, trade magazines, and 
marketing delegations. In addition, complementarities can make buying from a cluster more 
attractive for customers because it allows them to “multi-source” or to switch sellers if there is 
a need for it. 
 
4.3 Criticism of the Diamond Framework 
 
As the title suggests, this part will deal with the criticism of the Diamond framework and 
some major challenges it faces as the world economy has changed since it was first published 
in 1990.  
 
The major academic objections have been Porter’s choice of the nation as the unit of analysis. 
This view is shared by Rugman and D’Cruz (1993), Cartwright (1991), Rasmussen et.al. 
(2002) and others. There has been a development from Porter’s focus on nations, via Rugman 
and D’Cruz’ emphasis on regions to Rasmussen and Madsen’s world perspective.  
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4.3.1 The Double Diamond Framework 
 
A major drawback with the diamond framework; is according to Rugman and D’Cruz (1993), 
that the framework is developed with MNEs originating in one of the triad blocks in mind, 
leaving MNEs in small economies without a proper analyzing-tool.  However, it is only a 
small number of firms that has the financial and organizational capabilities and resources to 
choose location by the criteria mentioned by Porter (1998a), it is the MNEs. More 
specifically, it is the MNEs of the US, Japan and the EU, i.e. the triad.  
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (2004) proposition of the transnational firm suggests that MNEs are 
becoming increasingly independent from single nations, instead they use selective parts of 
many nations’ diamonds to gain international advantage.  
 
Rugman and D’Cruz (1993) argue that MNEs originating in small, open economies, to a large 
extent is guided by the requirement for market access to, and hence, also competitiveness in, 
at least one of the triad blocks. For firms competing in one or more triad blocks, both the 
home nation diamond and the diamond of the particular triad block may be of high relevance. 
MNEs in both the small country and in the triad block(s) may turn to all the national 
diamonds included for factor conditions, supporting industries, customers etc. What is 
important to notice is that such behaviour merges the national diamonds into one, big regional 
diamond.  
 
Rugman and D’Cruz (1993) have modified Porter’s diamond into a Double Diamond 
framework to make it more applicable to MNEs in small nations. As an example, they have 
used the relations between the neighbours Canada and the United States of America. The 
message is that managers need to assess the determinants of competitiveness in both Canada 
and the United States simultaneously when developing corporate strategies. This initiative is 
supported by Cartwright (1993), who has done a similar analysis of New Zealand.  
 
The double diamond framework shows that the Canadian and the American national 
diamonds have merged into a North American diamond, i.e. strong arguments for the fact that 
also other than the home country may be of crucial importance for an MNE’s international 
competitiveness. This view is also supported by Dunning (1993). 
 
This paragraph has shown that Porter’s diamond, as originally formulated, has most 
explanatory effect on MNEs originating from one of the triad-blocks. For MNEs in small, 
open economies and to some extent, also SMEs, their number one task when going 
international is to secure access to and compete in one or more of the triad blocks. 
Determinants in other nations’ diamonds can therefore influence the core competencies of 
these firms as much as the ones of the home base.   
 
Rugman and D’Cruz (1993) have been aware of this challenge, and have developed a double 
diamond framework which shows that both the nations’ diamonds merge into a common 
business area, and hence, presents an analyzing tool better suited for the reality of firms in 
small countries. 
 
 
 
Porter’s Home Country Diamond Approach to Canadian Business 
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Supporting industries and 
institutions 
Physical and human resources Canadian customers 
Leading Canadian-based businesses government 
Canada 
United States 
    Exports to the United States 
 
(Source: Rugman and D’Cruz 1993) 
 
 
 
 
A Double Diamond Approach to Canadian Business 
 
 
 
 
North American 
business 
Canadian-based resources Canadian customers 
Canadian governments 
Supporting industries and 
institutions 
U.S.-based resources U.S.-customers 
U.S. governments 
Exports outside 
North America 
Exports outside 
North America 
Supporting infrastructure 
 
(Source: Rugman and D’Cruz 1993) 
 
4.3.2 The Born Global Concept 
 
When explaining international business and international expansion in particular, scholars 
have often referred to the well-known stage models. According to these models, firms first 
establish a solid home base, then expand stepwise starting with the neighboring countries and 
continue expanding to areas farther away from home. Adopting such evolutionary approach to 
international expansion is though very time consuming, often several years, or even decades, 
are required until firms are ready to go international5.  
 
The Born Global concept in many ways constitutes a fundamentally different view.  
According to McKinsey this type of firm typically starts exporting less than two years after 
the firm’s foundation, and the characteristics of the firms are the following: “These firms view 
the world as a market place from the outset and see the domestic market as a support for their 
international business” (McKinsey & Co. 1993, p. 9). 
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5 See among others Rasmussen et.al. 2002 
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The notion of Born Globals was first mentioned in a survey for The Australian Manufacturing 
Council by the consultants McKinsey in 1993. When interpreting the Australian survey, 
Cavusgil stated that “small is beautiful” and “gradual internationalization is dead” (1994, p. 
18). The Australian research consisted of an analysis of new exporters, with special focus on 
the emerging exporters; which were firms experiencing growing exports within the last five 
years before the survey was performed. The emerging exporters differed from other firms: 
“Characteristic for this new type of exporters (even the older firms) was that they did not see 
export and the foreign markets as a necessary evil. Instead they looked upon the world as one, 
large market.” (Rasmussen and Madsen, 2002, p. 7).  
 
The survey clearly demonstrated that two types of exporters could be found; at the one hand 
were the home market based firms which had established a solid home base market (i.e. the 
rationale of the Diamond framework). These were very experienced firms facing exporting as 
the major option if continued growth should take place. The other group, approximately 25% 
of all the firms, was the Born Globals.  
 
As shown in appendix number 2, there is no clear definition of a Born Global or similar 
concept. The definition used in the Born Global research in Denmark by Madsen et.al. (2000) 
was: “A Born Global is a production firm with an export percentage (compared to the total 
sale) of 25% or more, which have started exporting within three years after the firm’s 
foundation.”  
 
According to Rasmussen and Madsen (2002), the explanation for this new picture of 
internationalization of firms is claimed to be more global market conditions, new 
developments in transportation and communication technologies, and the rising number of 
people with international experience. The Born Globals are often high-tech firms, or 
companies that use well-known technology. A major factor in the explanation of the 
phenomenon Born Global is the management’s commitment to internationalization. The 
manager’s and the founder’s personal experience, relations, and knowledge are thought to 
have a great importance for the existence of Born Global firms. Also, the firm’s ability to 
standardize for instance production and marketing in a global niche instead of developing 
customized products is important. The idea is that even the smallest firm can have access to 
information about the export markets and can begin to export right from the birth. 
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According to all research done on “Born Global” as a concept, Rasmussen and Madsen (2002) 
think of it as an umbrella (or a metaphor) under which all similar concepts take place. This 
explains why research is carried out in the internationalization of small and medium sized 
firms. The purpose will be to give advice on how to manage problems of internationalization, 
and the societal aspect of internationalization (often raised as a question of export promotion 
programs). In addition, it can be useful to look at how to develop a theoretical understanding 
of firm’s internationalization. Changes in the economy including factors that can be related to 
special home-market conditions and changes in the firms themselves (management and 
founders) can be the reasons for the new internationalization concept. Markets are expanding 
internationally, and consequently the home-market advantage disappears, especially in a small 
country like for instance Denmark or other Scandinavian countries. The development of more 
intensive competition can also promote the disappearance of the home market. 
 
4.4 Porter’s diamond and e-commerce 
 
So far, the conceptual critics of the diamond framework have been discussed. The discussion 
on the validity of the diamond continues, focusing on the impact of internet and new ways of 
doing business and reaching customers.  
 
According to scholars like  Laudon and Laudon (2003) and Parsons and Oja (2006) e-
commerce includes internet activities like online shopping, electronic auctions, online travel-
ticket ordering, online banking and stock trading and online education. The unique feature of 
shopping digital products like news, music, videos, databases, software, and all types of 
knowledge-based items, is that they can be transformed into bits and delivered over the web. 
Consumers can get them immediately upon completing their orders, and no one pays shipping 
costs.  
 
Typical e-commerce activities are B2C, C2C, B2B and B2G (where B is business, C is 
customer, G is government). 
 
The issue with e-commerce and the diamond-framework is the assumption that online 
business makes country borders less significant. Parsons and Oja (2006) go on arguing that as 
long as the customers have internet-access, credit card for payment possibilities and access 
web pages are written in a language understandable to them, all requirements needed for a 
successful e-commerce transaction are evident. For online orders of physical products, some 
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countries may suffer from shipping limitations, but otherwise, countries and home country 
markets are of lesser significance than what is the case for bricks and mortars businesses (the 
traditional physical stores).  
 
If the assumption of country borders having less importance for e-commerce business is 
credible, then some of the very foundation of the diamond framework falls apart. Porter’s 
starting point, as described above, is that “A firm’s home base is considered to be the nation 
where it retains effective strategic, creative and technical control, i.e. it is the source of the 
MNE’s core competencies. “ (Rugman, 1993). As internet-firms work with the entire world as 
their marked, they do not have a specific home market to turn to. Hence, the location of the 
home base is no longer of any significance. 
 
Instead, e-commerce businesses source their advantages elsewhere. From a customer’s view, 
e-commerce offers some unique advantages over brick-and-mortar stores. They can easily 
search through large catalogues, compare prices between multiple vendors, arrange products 
online, and not least, shop whenever they feel like independent of opening hours.  
 
Porter (2001), on the other hand, does not agree with the assertion of internet and e-commerce 
as a new economy. His main arguments for this is that e-commerce so far has failed to 
produce high profitability for the firms involved and thereby has not been strong enough as an 
influencing force to be able to create any industry structure of its own. According to him, 
“Internet technology provides better opportunities for companies to establish distinctive 
strategic positioning than did previous generations of information technology” (Porter, 2001). 
By this he means that internet in itself is not a competitive advantage, but that it can be used 
as a tool to compete. By doing so, it may seem as he defends the old position regarding online 
shopping just as a supplement to the traditional bricks-and-mortars, and not as the 
independent corporate structure it has become.  
 
V. Entry Strategies 
 
The focus now turns to the how-question. Entry strategies can be regarded as recipes or 
guided plans for the company’s establishment of businesses abroad.  They vary from simply 
exporting excessive goods produced mainly for home market to so-called green-field 
subsidiaries, which is company subsidiaries built up from scratch. With the varieties in range 
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and ambition, there will also be differences according to financial resources necessary for the 
establishment, organizational capabilities, staff and training of staff and expected return on 
investment.  
 
In chapter 3 different motivations for an international entry mode were outlined. Different 
motivations give different reasons for an international entry, and hence, different choice of 
entry strategy. This chapter is mainly based on the Hierarchical Model of Market Entry 
Modes (Pan and Tse 2000), Kotabe and Helsen’s (2001) textbook in International Marketing 
and Zhan (1999).  
 
According to the Hierarchical Model, the main criterion for the choice of entry strategy is 
whether the firm engages in equity or non-equity modes. The same classification is supported 
by Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden (2005). Pan and Tse (2000) argue that the choice of entry 
strategies depends on two different types of factors; firm-specific factors and industry-specific 
and country-specific factors (macro level factors). They continue to stress the importance of 
the macro level factors as decisive for the differentiation between equity modes and non-
equity modes. 
 
Which of the two modes the firm decides on, depends on whether the firm can be classified as 
an MNE or not. MNEs typically engage in equity modes whereas non-MNEs usually pursue 
non-equity modes. This is also supported by Peng (2006), as he states: “[…] determine 
whether the modes of entry would be equity- or non-equity-based. This crucial decision 
differentiates an MNE (which employs equity modes) from a non-MNE (which relies on non-
equity modes).” He further argues that “In fact, this crucial distinction is what defines an 
MNE: An MNE enters foreign markets via equity modes through foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which refers to direct control and management of value-adding activities overseas.” 
(Peng, 2006, p. 230-231). The non-equity entry modes most often require less financial and 
organizational resources and capabilities of the firms involved than is the case of equity 
modes. Also, the cost, commitment, risk, return, and control involved is often more limited 
than in the case of equity entry modes (Peng, 2006, p. 231).  
The Hierarchical Model of Market Entry Modes  
 
Choiceof entrymodes
Non - equity modes Equity (FDI) modes
Exports Contractual agreements 
Joint ventures
(JV)
Wholly owned 
Subsidiaries(WOS) 
Direct exports
Indirect exports 
Others
Licensing/
franchising
Turnkeyprojects
R&D contracts
Comarketing
MinorityJVs
50/50 JVs
MajorityJVs
Greenfields
Acquisitions
Others
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from Peng 2006) 
 
There are four broad categories of entry modes, each with subcategories; exports, contractual 
agreements, joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries.  
 
5.1 Exports 
 
Export is a low commitment entry mode, and the mode that companies typically choose by 
the start of an international expansion. Both Kotabe and Helsen (2001) and Peng (2006) 
support this view, stating that an international expansion usually starts with an exporting 
strategy, moving towards contractual agreements and the FDI modes as complexity and 
organizational resource demands evolve. For many small firms exporting is the only real entry 
mode alternative. It is common to distinguish between two types of exporting; direct and 
indirect exporting.  
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5.1.1 Direct Exports 
 
“Direct exports means that the company sets up its own export organisation within the 
company and relies on a middle man” (Kotabe & Helsen, 2001). This middleman is often an 
agent that entails selling products made in the home-market demand to customers in other 
countries.  
 
The advantage of direct exporting is that control of its international operations is kept within 
the firm organization than what is the case with indirect exporting. Hence, direct exporting 
facilitates a good opportunity for the company to build a business network with potential local 
partners. Zhan (1999) supports this view emphasizing the advantages of direct exports when it 
comes to control over product distribution, price and sales efforts.  
 
The disadvantage with this entry strategy is that the firms may not have enough resources to 
pursue international opportunities which can be turned into sales and profits. Furthermore, 
they may also be unfamiliar with how to turn opportunities abroad into sales profit. Other 
disadvantages with direct exports are high transportation costs for bulky products and 
marketing distance from customers. In addition, it may provoke protectionism because of 
trade barriers. 
 
 5.1.2 Indirect Exports 
 
Indirect exports means that the company uses a middleman based in the company’s home 
market, to do the exporting (Kotabe & Helsen, 2001). This middleman can be a trading house, 
a broker or an export management company. The major advantage is access to a foreign 
market, using a minimum of company resources. Hence, very little risk is involved. Other 
advantages with indirect exports are the concentration of resources on production and that 
there is no need to directly handle export processes.  
 
The major disadvantage is the little or no control the firm has over the way its products is 
handled in the foreign country. If the middleman has little or no experience or does not meet 
the company’s requirements for an appropriate way of doing business, the company cannot 
take control of the process itself. According to Zhan (1999) it may be a problem that the 
middleman also is the agent of the competitors’ products. This may happen if the firm does 
 32
                                                          
not engage in exclusive contracts with its middlemen, securing that the distributor only deals 
with the particular firm’s products or products from non-competing firms. The only possible 
option will be to replace the middleman. Other disadvantages are less control over distribution 
(relative to direct export), and the inability to learn how to operate overseas.6  
 
 5.1.3 Others 
 
In addition, Kotabe and Helsen (2001) mention a third form of exporting; the cooperative 
exporting. This mode is characterized by a firm entering into an agreement with another 
company (local or foreign) where the partner will use its distribution network to sell the 
exporter’s goods. This is an excellent choice for companies that are not willing to use their 
own resources, but take the advantages of a co-operation, exploiting the other’s resources. 
 
5.2 Contractual agreements 
 
Contractual agreements include licensing/franchising, turnkey projects, R&D contracts and 
co-marketing. 
 
5.2.1 Licensing/franchising 
 
Licensing refers to a business arrangement in which the manufacturer (the licensor) of a 
product or a firm with proprietary rights over certain technology, trademarks, etc. grants 
permission to some other group or individual (licensee) to manufacture that product (or make 
use of that proprietary material) in return for specified royalties or other payment.7 
Franchising is a specialized form of licensing in which the franchiser sells intangible property 
to the franchisee and insists on rules to conduct the business.8 It represents essentially the 
same idea as licensing, but it is typically used in service industries. “Whereas licensing is 
pursued primarily by manufacturing firms, franchising is employed primarily by service 
firms” (Hill, 2005). 
 
Hill (2005) continues to argue that the advantage for licensors and franchisors is that they can 
expand abroad with relatively little capital of their own. For SMEs this can be advantageous 
6 These arguments are commonly agreed upon by scholars like Kotabe & Helsen (2001), Hill, (2005), 
Gooderham & Nordhaug (2003), and others.  
7 http://www.eaca.com/.docs/pg/11222 
8 http://enbv.narod.ru/text/Econom/ib/str/261.html 
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as these can be resource constrained. Licensing/franchising is also advantageous when it 
comes to low development costs and the low risk in overseas expansion. 
 
A disadvantage with this form of entry strategy is that the licensors/franchisors can loose 
control over how their technology and brand are being used. Franchising is similar to 
licensing, although franchising tends to involve longer-term commitments than licensing. The 
little control over technology and marketing may create competitors, and the inability to 
engage in global coordination may also be a result. One way for the licensor/franchisor to 
protect the company’s business model and core competencies, is to seek pattern or trademark 
protection abroad.   
 
5.2.2 Turnkey projects 
 
 A turnkey project is when a separate entity is responsible for setting up a plant or equipment 
(e.g. trains/infrastructure) and putting it into operations before handing back the project to the 
company which has asked for the consulting practise. It can include contractual actions at 
least through the system, subsystem, or equipment installation phase and may include follow-
on contractual actions, such as testing, training, logistical, and operational support. It is often 
given to the best bidder in a procurement process.9 Turnkey projects may give the possibility 
to earn returns from process technology in countries where FDI is restricted.  Disadvantages 
are that if foreign clients are competitors, selling them state-of-the-art technology through 
turnkey projects may turn them into efficient competitors. In addition, turnkey projects do not 
allow for a long-term presence after the “key” is handled to clients (Peng, 2006). 
 
 5.2.3 R&D Contracts  
 
According to Peng (2006), R&D contracts refer to outsourcing agreements in R&D between 
firms. An advantage is that these contracts give firms the ability to tap into the best locations 
for certain innovations at low costs. However, disadvantages are that it is difficult to negotiate 
and enforce contracts given the R&D’s uncertain and multidimensional nature. Other 
disadvantages are that R&D may foster innovative competitors, and the firms may loose core 
innovation capabilities in the long run. 
 
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turnkey_project 
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5.2.4 Co-marketing 
 
Co-marketing refers to agreements among a number of firms to jointly market their products 
and services. The advantage with this agreement is the capability to reach more customers, 
while the disadvantage is limited control and coordination because everything has to be 
negotiated between the firms that are co-marketing (Peng, 2006). 
 
5.3 Joint Ventures 
 
A joint venture (often abbreviated JV) is a strategic alliance between two or more parties to 
undertake economic activity together. The parties agree to create a new entity together by 
both contributing equity, and they then share in the profits, losses, and control of the 
enterprise. The venture can be for one specific project only, or a continuing business 
relationship such as the Sony Ericsson joint venture.10  A JV can have three principal forms; 
Minority JVs (less than 50% equity), 50/50 JVs, and majority JVs (more than 50% equity) 
 
JVs have many advantages. They can share costs and risks with a local partner and gain 
access to the partner’s knowledge about the host country. In return, the local firm benefits 
from the MNE’s expertise in technology, capital and management. Additionally, JVs can be 
politically more acceptable than WOS.  
 
Disadvantages may be that it can be difficult to involve partners from different backgrounds, 
divergent goals and incompatible capabilities. It may also be difficult to achieve effective 
equity and operational control because everything must be shared and negotiated, and it can 
be difficult to coordinate globally (Peng, 2006). 
  
5.4 Wholly owned subsidiaries 
 
What separates WOSs from the other entry modes is that the company now enters the new 
market with a 100 percent ownership. There are two primary ways to set up a WOSs; 
acquisitions and green-field operations. 
 
10 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_ventures 
 35
                                                          
5.4.1 Green-field Operations 
 
Green-field operations refer to building factories and offices from scratch. A green-field WOS 
gives an MNE complete equity and management control. This control leads to a better 
protection of proprietary technology and know-how. In addition, a WOS allows for centrally 
coordinated global actions. Further, green-fields do not have to deal with problems of 
integrating different corporate cultures of parent companies, as is the case partially in JVs and 
particularly in acquisitions (Gooderham and Nordhaug, 2003). Hence, green-fields give the 
company more freedom and flexibility.  Drawbacks with a green-field WOS are the costs and 
risks involved (both politically and financially) and the slow entry speed as it takes at least 2 
or mores years to start up a company (Peng, 2006). 
 
5.4.2 Mergers and Acquisitions11
 
Gooderham and Nordhaug (2003) define mergers and acquisitions as “mergers are usually the 
result of a friendly arrangement between companies of roughly equal size, whereas 
acquisitions are unequal partnerships, often the product of a hard-fought battle between 
acquiring and target companies”.  
 
An acquisition is probably the most important entry mode given the amount of capital 
involved, it represents approx. 60% of global FDI (i.e. JVs and WOSs). Advantages with 
acquisitions are faster entry speed and the same benefits that green-field WOS take hold of. 
Acquisitions share all the disadvantages of green-field WOS (except slow entry speed) and 
post-acquisition integration problems (Peng, 2006). Kotabe & Helsen (2001) mention three 
major disadvantages. The first is linked to the differences in the corporate culture of the two 
merging/acquiring companies, and a new unified identity may be hard to establish. Second, 
the result of the acquisition does not always accomplish the expectations; consequently, 
disappointment and dissatisfaction will influence the corporate culture. Finally, an acquisition 
can turn out to be a very expensive entry mode. Attractive partners are scarce and are usually 
not willing to be acquired, and if so, they set a high price on themselves. 
 
11 Although, the Hierarchical Model only deals with acquisitions, we find it useful to also include mergers as 
many of the drawbacks with acquisitions also have some validity to mergers.  
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PART TWO 
 
CONNECTING THE DIAMOND FRAMEWORK AND ENTRY 
STRATEGIES – Designing an Extended Framework 
 
So far, a thorough presentation of the existing theory the thesis rests upon have been 
presented. Yet, the main task remains; linking the Diamond framework and the Entry 
Strategies together and designing an extended framework.  
 
VI. Theoretical Fundament for Connecting the Diamond 
framework and Entry Strategies 
 
The purpose of this paragraph is to examine how the connection can be characterized. The 
paragraph starts with an overview of relevant academic articles and continues with a 
discussion on why it is reasonable to expect a connection.  
 
6.1 Bibliography 
 
When conducting the bibliographical search, several relevant academic articles were 
collected. Besides Pan and Tse’s (2000): The Hierarchical Model of Market Entry Modes, 
these were considered as relevant; Malhotra et.al. (2003): Internationalization and Entry 
Modes: A Multitheoretical Framework and Research Propositions, Keillor et.al. (2001): 
Market Entry Strategies and Influencing Factors: A multi-industry / multi-product 
investigation, Davis et.al. (2000): Mode of International Entry: An Isomorphism Perspective 
and Dunning (2000): The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business 
theories of MNE activity.  
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6.2 Is it Reasonable to Expect a Connection?  
 
The main task of this paragraph is to examine why it is reasonable to expect a connection 
between the competitive advantage of nations and firm’s choice of entry strategies. The task is 
solved by first identifying the variables which have an impact on the choice of entry 
strategies. Second, once the key variables are revealed, links to the Diamond-framework can 
be recognized.  
 
The literature mentioned in the previous paragraph, classifies two broad categories of 
variables important for the choice of entry strategies; the macro level variables (external) and 
the firm level (internal) variables (Malhotra et.al., 2003). The macro level variables typically 
consist of political arrangements both in home market and in host country nation (HCN), 
judicial systems and entry / exit barriers within HCN, see Pan and Tse (2000) and Dunning 
(2000). Typically firm level variables are human and financial capital, motivations, risk 
orientation and the preferred amount of control over its subsidiaries.  
 
The identified variables may also be applicable for the Diamond framework. Both macro and 
firm level variables influence the determinants, as Porter mentions most of them in his work, 
see chapter 4. Based on this observation, it is reasonable to argue that some form of 
connection exists.  
 
Nevertheless, the choice of entry strategy is according to Davis.et.al. (2000), a firm level 
activity. The implication of this is a relatively stronger emphasis on the firm level variables 
than industry level variables when explaining the connection.  
 
The challenge is to overcome the difference of level of analysis between the entry strategy 
decision and the Diamond framework, which is an industry level tool. Even if the Diamond 
framework is positioned at an industry level, Porter (1998b) argues that the firm’s 
competencies and characteristics form the competitive advantages of the particular industry 
within the nation. In other words, if the industry is to provide favourable competitive 
conditions, it is dependent on sophisticated companies striving for improvement and 
innovation. Successful industries are dependent on companies making the excellent decisions 
on firm level. This includes engaging in the most proper entry strategy for each company.  
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The reasoning in this paragraph forms the foundation for the design of the extended 
framework, which is the task in the next chapter. 
 
VII. Designing an Extended Framework 
 
The Extended framework originates from the Hierarchical Model of Market Entry Modes 
presented in the theory part of this thesis, therefore the title Extended framework. The main 
structure of the Hierarchical Model has been kept. The new feature in the Extended 
framework is two new levels of analysis; the influence of macro factors and the decision on 
main motivations for going international. 
 
First, the Extended framework and its variables are presented. Second, the Extended 
framework is carefully explained.  
 
 7.1 Extended Framework Variables 
 
The overall goal of the framework is assisting the company to make the best choice of entry 
strategy. Therefore, it is the choice of entry strategy which ties the entire framework together. 
The function of the other variables is simply influencing the choice in the direction which is 
most proper for the company situation.  
 
The variables used in the framework are the choice of entry strategy, macro factors, firm 
motivations, the choice of equity / non-equity mode, main categories of entry strategies and 
finally sub-category decision on entry strategy type. The hierarchical structure is shown in the 
figure on page 39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Choice of Entry Strategy 
Macro Factors 
Firm Motivations 
 
Equity (MNE) / non-Equity (non-MNE) 
Main Categories of Entry Strategies 
Sub- category Enty Strategy 
 
 
 7.2 Extended Framework Structure 
  
The framework consists of six levels, each shaded in different colours. This has been done to 
easier identify which variables belong to which level. The framework is hierarchically 
structured meaning that all options are available at the start of the internationalization process, 
at the top of the framework. As the firm follows the structure downwards in the hierarchy, the 
number of options will narrow until there are only a few entry strategies left to choose among. 
 
The two added levels are placed at the top of the hierarchy, between choice of entry strategy 
and equity / non-equity modes. Macro level factors are divided into four equal groups: Host 
Country Factors, Home Country Factors, Host and Home Country and Industry Factors12. The 
macro factors apply to the location question – the where question – as they characterize and 
describe features of the HCNs and bilateral relations among countries. 
 
However, the Hierarchical Model does not pay any attention to firm motivations. In the 
extended framework, motivations are placed at the level below macro factors. The 
motivations relate to the why-question, and will be decisive for the final choice of entry 
strategy.  
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12 The classification of macro factors in four groups are done in accordance with Pan and Tse’s (2000) work, see 
figure 2, p. 539.   
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At the next level, firms decide for either a non-equity mode or an equity mode. The decisive 
variable is firm type, where MNEs / SMEs normally go for the equity modes, whereas non 
MNEs choose non-equity modes.  
 
The next choice is to decide for the main types of entry strategies. There are four main 
categories; exports, contractual agreements, JV and WOS. Finally, the firm has to decide for 
which subcategory to pursue.  
 
On the next page, the complete Extended Framework is presented, followed by an explanation 
of the two added levels; macro factors and firm motivations. 
 
7.2.1 Macro Level Factors  
 
There are four main macro level factors: Host Country Factors, Home Country Factors, Host 
and Home Country and Industry Factors.  
 
The macro level factors are placed underneath the choice of entry strategy because they are 
already determined by world economy and political institutions. These macro factors 
influence both the business context in the country and the industry. Furthermore, the macro 
factors will influence the firm’s motivations, and are consequently placed above the firm 
motivation level. 
 
Host Country Factors constitute of prioritized location and host country risk.  When 
establishing in host country nations, foreign firms seek for certain areas that has been reserved 
in particular for foreign business activities. There are several reasons why these zones are 
attractive for localization. The first one is that in areas categorized by high stability and 
predictability, firms will feel safer due to lower country risk. This argument is supported by 
Pan and Tse (2000), and Rodriguez et al. (2005, p.388). 
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Host country factors will have less influence on exporting firms because location will not be of 
the same importance as demand conditions. For contractual agreements location will be more 
important because there is a larger extent of cooperation between the two nations when 
transmitting knowledge. When it comes to equity modes, WOS will be more dependent on the 
localization of host countries than JVs, due to the responsibility being involved.  
 
Home country factors refer to management orientation and risk orientation. Both management- 
and risk orientation build upon cultural dimensions.  Exporting and contractual agreements may 
be firms classified by high uncertainty avoidance. This means that the management will not allow 
much risk involved.  When it comes to management orientation, firms will have a larger power 
distance in hierarchies. JVs and WOS are usually firms originating in high power distance (Pan 
and Tse 2000). 
 
Host and Home factors refers to the structural and institutional similarities between the nations 
and the commitment due to long diplomatic ties. Tse and Pan (2000) argue that the length of 
these ties will decide if it is reasonable to invest in the host country: “The higher the volume of 
bilateral business, the more knowledge firms have accumulated about the host country market, 
and the more confident they are in adopting equity modes”. Host and Home factors will have a 
large extent of influence to all firms; it is not dependent on what type of entry mode a firm will 
prefer.   
 
Industry factors constitute of advertising intensity and capital intensity. Tse and Pan (2000) 
expect that host countries with high advertising intensity will attract firms because of the 
protection of brand names spreading the knowledge across the new market. Hence, host country 
firms will choose markets with a high advertising intensity. Exports and contractual agreements 
will not have the access to such capital needed for advertising campaigns, while JVs and WOS 
can start high intense advertising campaigns because they access more capital.  
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7.2.2 Firm Motivations 
 
The main task at this level is to link the Extended framework to the Diamond framework. The 
assumption is that the Diamond-analysis should reveal the characteristics of the home-market. 
The firm will take advantage of these characteristics when expanding abroad. Besides firm 
objectives, the firm uses the strengths of the industry to encounter international competitiveness. 
In situations where the home market cannot fulfil all of the Diamond determinants, the uncovered 
needs will contribute in defining the company motivations.  
 
The Diamond’s function in the Extended Framework is basically a tool for the firm to reach the 
proper firm motivation.  
 
VIII. Presentation of the Scenarios 
 
This chapter gives a brief introduction of the three scenarios created for analysis-purposes. The 
first two scenarios have their origin in the Porter Diamond framework, while the third deals with 
situations where the Diamond may not be the most suitable framework to apply. In addition, a 
brief discussion on the connection of the Diamond framework and firm motivations in scenario 1 
is given. This is done because as stated above in paragraph 7.2.2, determinants lacking in home 
base influence firm motivations for establishment abroad. The assumption is that what cannot be 
found in the home market, has to be searched for abroad.   
 
8.1 Scenario I – One or More Determinants Lacking in Home Base 
 
The first scenario takes place in a nation where the home market lacks one or more determinants 
of the Diamond-framework. The expectation is that the lacking determinant(s) will influence the 
main motivations of the firm to a large extent.  
 
The firm for this scenario is IKEA. The firm has been chosen because of its unique international 
success and its impressive growth throughout the continents of the world. Although, when it 
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started up in post-war Sweden, the entire furniture cartel opposed the newly established firm. 
They had no choice but to go international.  
 
 8.1.1 Diamond-determinants Connected to Firm Motivations 
 
The priority of this paragraph is to outline how the Diamond analysis is connected to firm 
motivations. Below a presentation is given of which motivations best apply if the given 
determinant is lacking in the home base. The connection is based on the theory part in the thesis.   
 
¾ Factor Conditions relate to Resource Access if the basic factors of production cannot be 
found in the home country. On the other hand, if highly skilled and specialized workforce 
is lacking, factor conditions relates to Learning Objectives instead, as expertise has to be 
taken from abroad. Also, Co-ordination activities may apply if logistics are of great 
significance for the firm.  
 
¾ Demand Conditions cannot, according to Porter (1998), be absent in the home market 
because the competitive advantage of nations rests upon the home market demand. 
However, for firms located in small home markets, international expansion may be the 
only option to continue market growth as there is a limit for how much firms can mature 
in small home markets before no further growth is possible. The motivations which apply 
to this determinant are Market Development and Learning Objectives, as expertise and 
R&D are crucial for innovation.  
 
¾ Related and Supporting Industries applies to Resource Access to secure firm supply. 
Also, Co-ordination activities as a supporting function for successful resource access are 
important.  
 
¾ Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry forms the business context, and is therefore 
applicable to all motivations except for Co-ordination. The reason is that logistics are less 
culture-dependent than the other motivations.  
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8.2 Scenario II – All Determinants Present in Home Base 
 
The second scenario is located in a nation where the home market accesses all the Diamond-
determinants. Firms in such home-bases can fully concentrate on business development and 
growth strategies, and their motivations for going international will be solely driven by the 
visions and ambitions for the firm. The managers can concentrate on the advantages their home 
base provides and how to utilize them in the best possible manner.  
 
The firm chosen for this scenario is the Lerøy Seafood Group. The firm has been chosen because 
of its corporate history, location and firm size. The LSG is one of the largest sea-food exporters 
in Norway when it comes to sales number, and has international experience from main markets 
like Asia, the US, Russia and Eastern Europe.  
 
8.3 Scenario III – A New Business Context 
 
Finally, in the last scenario, some critical objections to the Diamond framework are raised. 
Several scholars have argued that the nation as unit of analysis is too small; hence the concepts of 
the Double Diamond Framework and the Born Globals are presented as alternative notions for 
analysis-purposes.  
 
To illustrate the concepts, Dell Computer Corporation has been chosen. Dell has grown rapidly 
over a very short period of time, defining its market as international from the very beginning. The 
firm has developed and used its Direct Model for reaching its customers, taking advantage of the 
e-commerce way of doing business.  
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PART THREE 
APPLICATION OF THE EXTENDED FRAMEWORK 
 
The main objective in this part of the thesis is to test the Extended framework. This is done by 
applying the framework to case scenario 1 and 2. First, the Diamond analysis is carried out to be 
able to identify firm motivations. Second, the cases are analyzed applying the Extended 
framework – according to what they should have done. Then the Extended framework analysis is 
repeated on the basis of what the firms actually have done. If any differences occur, it is 
discussed whether the theory is incomplete or if it is the company that has developed an excellent 
business strategy.   
 
At the other hand, scenario 3 illustrates the Born Global Concept and the influence of e-
commerce as an alternative way of achieving competitive advantage.  
 
VIII. Scenario I 
 
Traditionally, furniture has been regarded as very culture-specific in the sense that taste and 
preferences vary significantly among nations and ethnic groups. Therefore, the achievement of 
IKEA establishing warehouses in all major regions of the world which are selling more or less 
the same pieces of furniture, is overwhelming.  
 
 8.1 Case – IKEA 
 
The IKEA- adventure started out in the Swedish region of Älmhult in 1943, but it was first in 
1953 IKEA as we know it today, became a reality when the first warehouse opened in Älmhult. 
Its founder, Ingvar Kamprad, built the business from scratch inspired by his usually strong sales-
instinct and by values like simplicity, cost-consciousness, enthusiasm, renewal, responsibility and 
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humbleness. The IKEA name is actually an acronym of the initials of his name and origin; Ingvar 
Kamprad Elmtyrad (his home farm) Agunnaryd (name of the village where he grew up).  
 
Kamprad’s vision and business mission is central to the success of the company. The vision sets 
the ambitious goal “To create a better everyday-living for the many people” (www.ikea.no). The 
vision is operationalized by the formulation that IKEA was to offer “a wide range of home 
furnishing items of good design and function, at prices so low that the majority of people can 
afford to buy them” (www.ikea.no). 
 
To reach their goals, IKEA has in many ways revolutionized the furniture business with their 
innovation regarding product design, production, flat-packed knock down kits to make 
transportation both easier and more efficient, showrooms in their warehouses to demonstrate the 
functions and possibilities of their products, mass-print of the catalogue and effective channels of 
customer-feedback.  
 
The first IKEA warehouse opened in the Swedish town of Älmhult in 1953; then the expansion 
continued through the Scandinavian market through the 1960’s. During the 70’s and 80’s the 
important markets in Western Europe followed. The 70’s were also the decade when IKEA 
established its first warehouses outside Europe, 1975 in Australia and in Canada the following 
year. In 1990 IKEA established in Poland as the first of the East European countries. The year 
after the first Middle East warehouse was opened in the United Arab Emirates. Then Asia 
followed in 1998 and 1999 with stores in Shanghai and Beijing.  
 
Figures from the financial year 2004 (01.09.04-31.08.04) shows that IKEA worldwide had a 
turnover of 12.8 billion € - 81% of it in Europe, and that somewhat 90 000 employees worked for 
the company. There were 213 warehouses in 33 countries, but business presence like supplier-
relations and logistics centre in even more countries. The IKEA Corporation itself owns 189 
warehouses in 23 countries, whereas 23 warehouses are run as franchises. Many of these are 
located in countries very culturally different from Sweden, such as the United Arab Emirates, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Taiwan.  
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8.2 The Diamond – framework – which determinants are lacking? 
 
Although the Foundation which formally owns the IKEA Group (see appendix 4) is located in the 
Netherlands, it is no doubt that the home-base of IKEA is Sweden. The entire organization is 
built on the Swedish culture, norms and values. Also, the very important product design unit, 
IKEA of Sweden, is located to Älmhult, Sweden.  
 
8.2.1 Factor Conditions 
 
Human resources are one of the most important assets to IKEA. To be able to adapt quickly and 
properly to the values of the IKEA organization, the employees need to know Scandinavian 
culture and values. Further they should be able to communicate in Swedish. Although English is 
the business language, Swedish has remained the cultural language. To really understand the core 
values of the organization, the top management has stated that it is an absolute advantage that 
non-Scandinavian managers learn Swedish. The informality, the extreme cost-consciousness and 
the humbleness (Swedish ödmjukhet) can only create properly commitment if the Swedish 
culture, in which it is rooted, is well understood. The core values are believed to be the key to the 
success of IKEA and to spread across the ever growing organization, IKEA has created several 
management and corporate culture programs, the most famous one being “the IKEA way”. 
Employees here are taught in the history, the strategy and the product range of the company, 
often guided by Kamprad himself, and is expected to pass on what they have learned in their 
respective home countries. As the expansion has taken IKEA to areas culturally very different 
from Sweden and Scandinavia, such programs are very important to make sure that the corporate 
values remain alive.  
 
Physical assets are of no importance as to whether or not the home base provides any competitive 
advantages. Most of production is outsourced and the warehouse-buildings are owned and 
financed by the parent company in the Netherlands.  
 
As stated above, much of the firm-specific knowledge is rooted in Swedish culture and values. 
This also goes for the product design group of IKEA, which is located in Älmhult. This is to be 
inspired by the Swedish culture, as IKEA is trying to spread the image of Swedish design and 
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preferences across the world. The designers do not necessarily need to be from Sweden, but it is 
important that they commit themselves to the core values of the corporate culture.  
 
The capital needed is no longer accumulated in the Swedish market alone, but are now placed in 
the parent company, INKGA Holding B.V.  
 
Ingvar Kamprad early showed that IKEA understood the development of infrastructure and the 
importance of warehouse location and how private cars were about to change people’s shopping 
habits. The procedure has until recently been the same when establishing new warehouses: 
Finding rather inexpensive sites outside the city centre which is located near the main roads. It is 
easy for people to drive to the warehouses (instead of a city centre location), buy their furniture 
items and transport it back home in their cars. The warehouses are easily accessible for all the 
traffic passing by and the sites are big enough for large, free parking lots. This strategy and 
understanding of the impact of infrastructure development, turned out to be a great success in the 
early warehouse-establishments in Sweden and Norway. IKEA therefore brought this concept 
along the expansion that was to come.   
 
However, this strategy has been changed to some degree when establishing in areas where private 
cars are not as common as here. Examples are locations of several warehouses in China 
downtown instead of suburban sites. The overall strategy, it seems, is to choose the location 
where most people can reach them in the easiest way.  
 
Conclusion: Human resources, knowledge and infrastructure have, and still are, vital factors of 
production to the IKEA Group. The values of simplicity and humbleness have turned out to be of 
significant advantage. These, as they are implemented in the IKEA system, cannot be properly 
understood if not born and raised in the peasant communities of Sweden (or Scandinavia, as the 
three countries are rather culturally similar13), i.e. the home market has provided competitive 
13 Based on Hofsteede’s work on cultural dimensions. For an overview, see Trompenaars, Fons / Hampden-Turner, 
Charles: Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Global Business, 2nd ed, McGraw Hill, 
New York 1998 
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advantage. Cultural identities cannot easily be imitated by competing firms originating from 
another national and cultural context.   
 
8.2.2 Demand Conditions 
 
The chaos on the opening day of the Älmhult warehouse clearly showed that IKEA had found a 
large and uncovered customer-demand for cheaper home furniture items. The overwhelming 
response from customers in Sweden, gave the confirmation and the belief the top management 
needed for going international. The demand for IKEA products and style has shown to be 
amazingly high also outside Sweden. Everywhere huge crowds turn up for the opening 
ceremonies, and the annual profit of the Group keep increasing for every year. The fact that 
IKEA keep on opening new stores, but never have had to close down any, is evidence enough for 
the demand of IKEA items.  
 
According to the official website, approximately 410 million customers visited their stores 
worldwide in the financial year 2004. Although large quanta and low price is closely associated 
to IKEA, they have struggled against a label of poor product quality, especially in the early days. 
But, since IKEA only sells its own brand, they are very close to the end user and can more easily 
and direct catch up with customer preferences and opinions. In every warehouse, there are small 
questionnaires for the customers to give feedback on product range, services and suggestions for 
improvement. This is valuable information, and has led to remarkably better product quality over 
the years without any major price increase. Actually, IKEA every year cut prices on selected 
items they will focus on in particular the following year (e.g. this year they have cut the prices on 
wardrobes by 20% as the field of commitment is bedroom and bedroom furniture).      
 
However, even if the Swedish demand has been, and still are, very high, Sweden is a rather small 
market. If IKEA were to continue to grow, they had to go international and seek new markets. 
They had faced great success within Sweden and Scandinavia, and had to rely on the customer 
response they had received there and to try to transfer the same enthusiasm for their products 
abroad. Their sales numbers show they have succeeded.  
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Conclusion: The enthusiasm and loyalty of its Swedish customer lay the foundation IKEA 
needed for expansion. The company also uses customer feedback very active in their product 
improvement and new product design to ensure that they offer items the customers demand and 
are satisfied with. However, the Swedish home-market soon turned out to be too small for the 
ambitious goals and vision of IKEA. Expansion to new markets was necessary to secure further 
growth and reach “…the many people”.  
 
8.2.3 Related and Supporting Industries 
 
IKEA sells products under its own brand – IKEA of Sweden. When establishing its furniture 
business in the early 50’s, the Swedish furniture industry was impaired by cartels of 
manufacturers and retailers. Supply contracts and agreements on competitive practice among 
cartel members raised barriers of entry for new entrants and disciplined those who failed to 
follow industry norms, particularly on price. Hence, there were no chances of getting any 
contracts with manufacturers or established retailers in Sweden.  
 
IKEA had two choices – either to outsource its production or to set up production plants itself. 
The first alternative would be the least expensive choice, but also the most risky when it came to 
production and quality control and delivery reliance. The latter one needed a lot of capital as it 
meant building or acquiring production facilities. They chose a solution in-between. The 
Swedwood Group is the only production unit within the IKEA Group. Swedwood produces all 
the wooden furniture and wooden components (as most of the furniture is made of particleboard). 
But the majority of IKEA’s production is actually outsourced. IKEA builds long-term 
relationships with its suppliers, and binds themselves to order large volumes over a certain period 
of time, often 3-5 years. The suppliers oblige to deliver the ordered volume at the agreed time to 
the agreed price and quality.  
 
When searching for new suppliers, IKEA often turn to manufacturers in other industries. They 
may have the necessary production equipment and skills needed. IKEA then buy free production 
capacity, and gain a win-win situation for both parties. IKEA gets its products without major 
investments, and the supplier can utilize free capacity to earn some revenue. Examples of this are 
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a table which legs were made by a car body manufacturer and some stuffed animals that were 
made by left-over fabrics.  
 
The majority of the suppliers are located in Europe. Pr. 2004, 67 % of all purchases were made in 
Europe, according to the numbers on the official website. Many are located in the Eastern 
Europe. The second largest area of purchase is Asia with 30 %. 
 
Conclusion: Due to the cartel activities in Sweden, IKEA were forced to go international to find 
suppliers and manufacturers. They have long-term contracts mainly in Europe and Asia, and 
often buy free capacity of production from its suppliers. 
 
8.2.4 Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
 
IKEA has a very distinct Scandinavian management style emphasizing an informal style when it 
comes to for instance clothing and the ways co-workers address themselves and the managers in. 
Further, IKEA uses its core values actively in everyday life and problem solving meaning that the 
co-workers easier can, and do, identify with the objectives of the managers and, hence, the 
company’s (Björk 2000). A non-hierarchic, non-bureaucratic organization may be better suited 
for the retail industry where customer treatment and service and support are very decisive for the 
overall customer experience and total satisfaction with the retailer, than more formal 
organizations characterized by more formal rules for staff behaviour.  
 
Another key factor to success is the entrepreneurial spirit and strong shopkeeping instincts which 
can be found in Sweden. This goes in particular for Ingvar Kamprad, who at a very early age 
began trading with whatever items he could find in his native village (Björk 2000). Thus, IKEA 
is not the only retailing business from Sweden experiencing great international success. Others 
are H&M, Lindex, Åhlens, Clas Ohlson among others.  
 
Porter (1998b) stresses the importance of domestic rivalry. As discussed above, the industry 
structure was not favourable for IKEA, but by outsourcing the majority of the production, 
Kamprad and his crew were able to turn an obvious barrier of entry and market imperfection into 
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an advantage. By exploring new methods of doing business, although at a high risk, he and the 
rest of the IKEA organization could stay true to its firm strategy and vision, and at the same time 
compete both efficiently and effectively with its home base rivals. As Kamprad saw that he was 
succeeding, he kept, and still is, pushing for an ever-going creativeness and product focus so that 
IKEA can continue to set the agenda for casual home furniture trends.  
 
Conclusion: The business context of Sweden seems to be very much in accordance to the values, 
strategy and vision of IKEA. Its informal management style can be explained by the 
Scandinavian emphasis on equality and relative egalitarian society structure. Further, the cartel 
situation in the Swedish furniture industry turned out to serve IKEA’s cause instead of harming 
it. Because it the cartel, IKEA had to think different than the traditional firms involved with 
furniture, and Kamprad himself to this day emphasize the great significance of daring to be 
different (Björk 2000). 
 
8.2.5 Chance and Government 
 
Important chance events for the birth and the development of IKEA were the Second World War 
and the emergence of private motoring. Post-war economy and expensive wooden furniture 
meant that only the wealthy could afford to renew their home decoration, while the vast majority 
had to manage with what they already possessed. By offering non-expensive furniture items and 
dare challenge the cartel structure, IKEA soon positioned themselves as an important actor in the 
Swedish market.  
 
Also, by offering their customer the opportunity to bring the newly purchased items home with 
them in their cars, contributed to secure its growing popularity.  
 
Government actions have been of little significance for IKEA. 
 
Conclusion: It is chance events that have made the difference for IKEA. Post-war worries and 
private motoring also took place elsewhere, but it was in Sweden it happened, and the customer 
welcomed it.  
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8.2.6 Conclusion on the Diamond Consideration 
 
It is quite apparent that Sweden as the home base provides competitive advantages so great that 
international growth could succeed. It has rather favorable business context (firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry), it clearly has a large home demand for IKEA's products (demand 
conditions) and because of the strong corporate culture, mainly managers born within the 
Scandinavian area have been appointed top positions within the Foundation (factor conditions – 
human resources). In other words, they are seeking highly specialized workforce, but the 
competence they seek cannot be learned by any education. The competence they want is learned 
as a child raised and socialized into a certain set of cultural attributes. Hence, mainly Swedes or 
Scandinavians have filled the top positions of the company.  
 
The area where Sweden as the home base cannot satisfy is when it comes to related and 
supporting industries. Here, IKEA had to come up with its own solutions on how to overcome 
this obstacle.  
 
Also, despite enthusiastic home customers, the fact that Sweden is a small home market, 
continued growth required that an international approach had to be taken. The firm strategy also 
implied internationalization.  
  
 8.3 What IKEA Should do According to the Extended Framework 
 
The focus in this paragraph is to examine which entry strategy IKEA should choose according to 
the Extended framework, how the Diamond-analysis would impact on motivations, and hence, on 
entry strategies. Macro factors are not dealt with in this paragraph because they constitute of very 
industry-dependent factors, and it makes most sense analyzing them in accordance with the 
reality a firm faces, not the “reality” it could face.  
 
When first acknowledging the urge for an international business strategy, the first step is to figure 
out how to get access to the most favorable markets. The framework can be seen as a tool for 
choosing the most suitable and secure entry mode for the firm under its given circumstances.  
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 Deciding on Motivations: The first challenge is to figure out which motivation(s) is the most 
important for the firm’s international expansion. The Diamond analysis reveals which 
competitive advantages the firm possesses due to its home market and national industry 
characteristics.  
 
When performing the Diamond analysis on IKEA, the findings show that the firm had to go 
abroad to find supplier-relations, and that Sweden as the main market eventually became too 
small for the ambitious vision. It also shows satisfactory context and factor conditions.  
 
Hence, the main motivations for IKEA for going international are resource access and market 
development.  
 
Acknowledging Firm Type: The main task at this level of the framework is to decide whether or 
not IKEA is an MNE.  
 
According to the first criterion of necessary active management of the foreign units, IKEA has a 
very strong and alive corporate culture which functions as overall guidelines for all actions, staff 
behavior and business decisions. Internal learning programs like the IKEA Way (Björk 2000) 
which nominates so-called IKEA Ambassadors to spread its values and management style to new 
areas and aspirant programs for local manager development, and more, clearly shows that the 
criterion of active management is fulfilled.  
 
The second criterion of at least 10% FDI is also covered by IKEA. Total income for the FY 2004 
was 12, 8 billion EURO (figures taken from the websites of IKEA). Asia and North America 
contributed with 19 %, whereas the rest, 81 % of total income, originated from sales in Europe.  
 
Hence, IKEA can be regarded as an MNE. The MNE classification is also supported by the firm 
size. According to the 2004-numbers, IKEA employed roughly 84 000 co-workers worldwide, 
spread across 44 countries.  
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 Deciding on Entry Strategy: According to the Extended framework; MNEs should concentrate 
on equity entry modes, i.e. JVs or WOS. Taken into the consideration that IKEA requires to have 
ultimate control over its actions and operate independently, they should go for one of the WOS 
types, preferably greenfields, at least for the investments in physical assets. When it comes to 
production and suppliers, some kind of JV should be established, as IKEA has chosen not to have 
any major production units themselves. Most likely a 50/50 JV or a majority JV would be 
preferable due to the demand for control and independence, as described above.  
 
 8.3.1 Conclusion on Extended Framework Actions  
 
When using the extended framework as a tool for deciding entry strategy for IKEA, the main 
findings are that the firm, as an MNE, should pursue equity modes – JV and/or WOS. More 
precisely, either a greenfield approach or a majority or 50/50 JV. This corresponds well with the 
main motivations of IKEA – Marked Development and Resource Access. In theory, all entry 
modes are applicable to market development, but the non-equity modes were rejected due to the 
classification of IKEA as an MNE. Also, resource access mainly consists of equity based entry 
strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the Extended framework, this is what IKEA should do: 
 
 
Choice of Entry 
Strategy 
Market Development Resource Access 
Host Country Factors Home Country Factors 
Host & Home Country Industry Factors 
Equity Modes Equity Modes 
WOS 
Greenfeilds 
JV 
50 /50 JVs 
Majority JVs 
 
8.4 What IKEA Actually Has Done 
 
The focus now shifts from what IKEA theoretically should have done to what they actually have 
done. However, some of the findings from the previous paragraph will be valid also for this 
analysis. Those are main motivations, as the results here draw upon the Diamond analysis, and 
the firm classification. Thus, this section starts with the macro factors.  
 
Host Country Factors: When seeking land sites in HCNs, IKEA has developed their own 
search-criteria. They look for huge sites located next to busy main roads in the suburban areas of 
 57
 
 
 58
                                                          
the larger cities. A part of their business strategy is that customer should be able to bring their 
purchased items home at once. Hence, the location near roads and massive land areas to cover 
both the sizes of warehouse and parking lot is needed.  
 
This strategy has turned out successive wherever it has been applied14. Thus, IKEA does not have 
the need for locating in particular fields arranged by the HCN governments.  
 
Home Country Factors: According to Hofstede’s (2001) findings on Sweden in his research on 
cultural dimensions, the country can be characterized as rather risk averse (high uncertainty 
avoidance score) and a relatively small power distance, which means emphasis on equality and 
informality. These results go very well along with the organization and corporate culture of 
IKEA.  
 
Host and Home Factors: The international expansion of IKEA can easily be described as slow, 
sequential stages. The first warehouse in Sweden opened in 1958, followed by Oslo in 1963 as 
the first store outside Sweden. The second store outside its home base opened in Denmark in 
1969, and the first location outside Scandinavia happened in Zurich, Switzerland, in 1973, 30 
years after the foundation of IKEA. The interwoven cultures and histories of the Scandinavian 
nations and their long diplomatic ties made the neighbouring countries natural expansion areas 
for IKEA. Entering into known territory constitutes a lower risk than the unknown.  
 
Industry Factors: Neither of the Scandinavian markets may be characterized as very advertising 
intense during the 1960’s – this goes in particular for Norway. However, IKEA had already in 
1951 published their first furniture catalogue, which has become one of their main sources of 
product display, brand building and information towards its customer.  
 
Motivations and firm type are market development and resource access, and IKEA is classified 
as an MNE, cf. previous paragraph.  
 
14 However, some local adjustments have been made. In China, several warehouses are located downtown, as cars 
are not the main type of transportation yet, as it is in Europe and North America.  
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Deciding on Entry Strategy: IKEA has chosen three different modes of entry; for outsourcing 
production they sign long-term sourcing contracts with their suppliers; but for warehouse 
operation, the main entry strategy is greenfield engagement. However, 23 of the total 212 stores 
are run as franchisees, owned by external investors. Over half of these are found in markets 
regarded as difficult to get access to, and which are culturally very different from Sweden15. 
Also, their own production-unit, Swedwood, is operated as greenfields. Swedwood has 35 
factories located in 9 countries.  
  
 8.4.1 Conclusion on Real Actions   
 
This examination has revealed that IKEA stresses the importance of commitment and control 
over its subsidiaries, hence the strong aiming for greenfields start-ups. However, it has also 
shown how the firm concentrates on keeping cost at a minimum level, locating its property sites 
in suburban areas instead of the often more expensive down-town locations, and by circulating its 
own catalogue instead of relying heavily on external advertising channels. The famous cost-
consciousness also contributes to the choice of long-term sourcing contracts with its suppliers 
instead of a more expensive JV-structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 These are the UAE, Hong Kong, Israel, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi-Arabia, Singapore and Taiwan.  
 
 
Following the Extended framework, this is what IKEA have done: 
 
 
Choice of 
Entry 
Strategy
Market 
Develop. 
Resource 
Access 
Host 
Country 
Factors 
Home 
Country 
Factors
Host & 
Home 
Country 
Industry 
Factors 
Non-Equity 
 
Equity 
 
Non-Equity Equity 
Contractual 
Agreements 
Franchising 
external 
owned 
JV 
WOS 
Greenfields
IKEA- 
owned 
Contractual 
Agreements
WOS 
Greenfields
(Swedwood)
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8.5 Comparative Analysis 
 
The Extended framework is in its entirety based upon theory and theoretical considerations. In 
order to test the framework, it has been applied to the IKEA-case (and later, to the Lerøy Seafood 
Group-case) to explore if there is some kind of match between what the firm should do and what 
it actually has done. If not, a closer discussion is needed to figure out if it is the framework which 
has certain shortcomings, or if the firm has put some genius strategy into action. 
  
The findings differ in two ways; one regarding macro factors and the other regarding equity / 
non-equity modes. Concerning macro factors, IKEA has chosen different approaches than the 
theory suggests on host country and industry factors. When establishing new stores today, the 
brand name IKEA is so well-known and consolidated in the market that the customer mainly will 
follow the firm wherever it chooses to locate. Several places the situation is actually that other 
actor choose to locate near IKEA because of the unique attractiveness of customers to the area.  
 
Also in the field of marketing IKEA constitute a unique position. The catalogue is their main 
marketing tool. In 2004, 160 million copies were printed in 52 editions and 25 languages, 
according to the websites of the IKEA Group. New catalogue launches are usually accompanied 
with large media exposure and media interests. Another important marketing channel is the 
internet. During 2004, approximately 153 000 visits a day were made to the IKEA website. This 
is why IKEA does not have to rely upon good external advertising opportunities in HCNs.     
 
However, the most significant distinction was found at the level of equity / non-equity decision. 
The Extended framework suggested only equity-based modes due to the fact of IKEA being 
classified as an MNE, while the firm in real life has a much more varied style engaging both 
equity and non-equity modes. One of the reasons, and probably the most credible, is that the 
framework may seem a bit too rigid on the classification on firm type and size as the main 
principles for deciding upon equity or non-equity strategies. Besides, the fact that these two 
groups function as mutual exclusive groups contributes to reinforce the rigidity.  
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The choice to go for franchise-stores may have a quite natural explanation, though. As stated 
above, a majority of the franchisees are located in culturally very different nations than the 
Swedish. Being a foreigner, it may be particular hard to consolidate in these markets and to train 
staff into the very strong and distinctive corporate culture of IKEA. By letting local investors and 
managers take control over the everyday operations, they can manage to penetrate very different, 
but important markets, in a smoother and more elegant way than if had been the mother 
company.  
 
The non-equity choice of resource access can also be explained by conscious actions chosen by 
the firm. The fact that IKEA have chosen contractual agreements in form of long-term sourcing 
agreements instead of equity based options, is because of its extreme focus on keeping costs at a 
minimum. By buying production capacity, they secure the production of their products at very 
low rates of investments. This practice also allows IKEA to choose their partners carefully, 
signing those who are known for their skills and reliability. The drawback is that they loose 
control over the production process and the daily quality inspections. At the same time, they are 
totally dependent upon reliable delivery. If some of these actions fail, it can severely damage 
IKEA’s reputation and goodwill. Still, this is a risk the company is willing to take because of the 
cost benefits it provides. Several arrangements have been made to prevent unpleasant surprises to 
take place, i.e. product inspectors traveling around on the many production sites to control that 
everything is done in accordance to the instructions from the IKEA management.  
 
 8.6 Scenario Conclusion 
 
The intended actions of IKEA and the actual actions differ on two matters; macro factors and 
equity / non-equity considerations. Some of this can be explained by a somewhat rigid 
framework, and some by unique company performances.  
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IX. Scenario II 
 
The home market of the Lerøy Seafood Group is small; hence, the firm has achieved market 
development by expanding its international involvement. The case study also illustrates well that 
when a complete diamond is applicable, clusters are suitable for discussion on how to improve 
and gain new competitive advantages for the firm.  
 
 9.1 Case – The Lerøy Sea-Food Group (the LSG) 
 
The LSG can trace its existence back to 1899 when Ole Mikkelsen Lerøen started as a fisherman 
and fish wholesaler in the city of Bergen and then expanded operations to export live shellfish, 
herring and other fresh fish. Since that time the firm has been a pioneer in the Norwegian seafood 
business in two respects – in the commercialization of new species and in developing new 
markets. In 1939, two of his employees, Hallvard Lerøy sr. and Elias Fjeldstad, established the 
company that today is one of Lerøy Seafood Group’s principal companies - Hallvard Lerøy AS.  
Since its establishment, the firm has been a pioneering enterprise within a number of fields in the 
Norwegian fishing industry.  The main focus has always been on developing markets for fresh 
and frozen fish products, and the firm has frequently led the way into new markets or been the 
first to commercialise new species.  The pioneering spirit is still very much alive in the Group, 
which was the first to export fresh salmon to the USA and to establish direct air-borne deliveries 
of fresh salmon to Japan.16
 
Up to 1997, the Group was a traditional family company, until the company was reorganised as a 
public limited company. The firm was listed on the stock market in June 2002. Since then, the 
firm has introduced several stock issues, most recently in July 2005 when Aurora Salmon was 
acquired. Stock exchange listing of the parent company Lerøy Seafood Group ASA provides 
access to venture capital. This has facilitated considerable investments, which already have 
contributed towards a significant strengthening of the Group. Since 1999, the Group has acquired 
substantial interests in various domestic and international enterprises, and at the end of 2003, the 
16 www.leroy.no/uploads/LSGAnnualReport2004.pdf 
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Group controlled all the shares in Lerøy Midnor AS.17  Through this acquisition, the number of 
employees in Norway once again exceeds those in the Group’s overseas companies. 
 
Today the Group is well situated for continued profitable development and growth. It is the 
number one exporter of Norwegian salmon due to strong partnerships with some of the most 
dynamic, and cost efficient salmon farmers in Norway. Hallvard Lerøy is also the leading 
exporter of Norwegian salmon into the Japanese market. This was achieved amongst other things 
by building up an air bridge tonnes, and fresh whole fish or fillets are being flied directly from 
Norway to Japan. This system is also being used to develop markets for other species and the 
company has done some trials with blue mussels, with crab, and even with sea urchin. 
 
Hallvard Lerøy AS is the largest company in the Group measured in sales, with a turnover of 
NOK 3,083 million in 200418. The figure above represents the Group’s sales network where 
many countries are included. The company has sales offices in France, Spain, Italy, China, Japan, 
Portugal and the USA, and the company is continuously working to establish a presence in new 
markets in the future. They have had an extreme growth in the US, China, Central and Eastern 
Europe (Russia and Poland), Japan and in the EU countries.  
 
The product range is mainly value added products such as fillets, portions, and fresh products 
while frozen products form a more limited part of the business. As fresh cod is a specialty and 
supplies have been decreasing the company has provided a lot of encouragement to the new wave 
of cod farming sweeping Norway. Ten years ago a number of cod farming trials were carried out 
which were mostly unsuccessful. The company’s own contribution has been on the sales side to 
position the fish at the upper end of the market as fresh whole fish or fillets rather than the less 
lucrative dried or dried salted fish.  
 
 
17 See in appendix for company structure 
18 www.leroy.no/uploads/LSGAnnualReport2004.pdf 
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9.2 The Complete Diamond - Cluster Discussion 
 
The Lerøy Seafood Group operates through subsidiaries in Norway, Sweden, France and 
Portugal, as well as through the network of sales offices that ensures its presence in the most 
crucial markets. The firm strategy is to meet the ever increasing demands of the markets for 
quality, product range, cost efficiency and continuity of supply. 
 
9.2.1 Factor Conditions 
 
Although knowledge and competencies have been inherited from one generation to the next for 
centuries, the fish farming industry adventure demands a more advanced and specialized 
competency. The fish farms require knowledge and expertise of technical art for the facilities, but 
the most crucial is the research on biology, diseases that may occur and on satisfactory nutrition. 
For this highly qualified employees are needed. Several Norwegian Colleges and Universities 
offer educations related to fish farming research and studies, i.e. the University of Bergen, the 
Institute of Marine Research, the Bergen University College, the University of Tromsø and 
others.  
 
This expertise has led the industry to the position it enjoys today as one of the world’s largest 
producers of Atlantic salmon. Although, most associated with salmon, research continues for the 
development of fish farming methods also valid for other species, like different types of mussels 
and other fish species.  
 
Norway has had fish farming industry since the 60’s, and has continuously improved and 
innovated the physical assets of the industry – like the feeding procedures, farm facilities, deep 
freeze technology  for transportation and other effective logistics.  
 
When it comes to infrastructure, Norway has a disadvantage in relation to location and the most 
important seafood-markets (like the EU, the USA, Japan, Russia and South-East-Asia): long 
distance. But, the Norwegian industry has met this challenge by developing very good methods 
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of logistics – both by trucks and aircrafts – so that the infrastructure now seems to work very 
well.  
 
The Norwegian climate and location is well suited for fisheries and fish farm industry with its 
long coast line and access to open sea. The cold and pure water are important for the high quality 
of Norwegian fish.  
 
Conclusion: Norway is able to offer the fish farming industry and its actors very favourable 
conditions, in particular when it comes to human resources and beneficial natural resources.  
 
9.2.2 Demand Conditions 
 
Fish has always been an important ingredient in the traditional Norwegian diet. Strong 
preferences for taste and quality have developed over the years, and turned the Norwegian 
customers into highly demanding and sophisticated consumers. These demanding preferences 
have served as guidelines for the Lerøy Seafood Group, making them understand the importance 
of outstanding quality.  Also, Norwegian seafood abroad has a good reputation.  
 
In recent years, new demands for seafood have been created by the focus on health benefits. The 
fatty acids of fatty fish, like salmon, mackerel, herring and trout, are good for many reasons, like 
preventing heart diseases and some types of cancer and it is good for the blood circulation. In 
addition, fatty fish is good for the mental health. 
 
New food-habits from other corners of the world, also creates demand for other types of seafood 
than have traditionally been cultivated in Norway. This in particular goes for mussels and shell 
fish like scampi. Such new demands make excellent opportunities for innovation and research for 
new fish farm species, and during the last decade, several producers have experimented with new 
and non-traditional products. And, the political trade barriers that have been forced on the 
Norwegian fish farming industry by the EU-authorities, underline the need to open up new 
markets. 
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Conclusion: Norwegian customers are highly sophisticated and demand excellent quality on the 
fish they buy. This has sharpened the producers, knowing that if they wanted to sell their fish, it 
had to be at least as good as their competitor’s, or even better. Hence, the Norwegian fish and fish 
products enjoy a good reputation also outside the country. However, due to political sanctions 
from the EU, most growth and new market share capture seems to take place in markets outside 
the EU, like Russia and South East Asia.   
 
9.2.3 Related and Supporting Industries 
 
Related industries present in Norway are suppliers of technical devices for the fish farm facilities, 
for the cold storages and manufacturers of fish nutrition.   
 
9.2.4 Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
 
Throughout the year 2004, Norway has succeeded in sustaining its position as the world’s leading 
producer nation of the company’s main product, farmed Atlantic salmon. Even when the figures 
include wild salmon, Norway remains the largest supplier of Atlantic salmon. However, Norway 
is now in danger of losing this position due to political sanctions like punitive duties (see 
paragraph on government).  
 
The Lerøy Group’s level of activity is good, and the Board believes future prospects for the 
company to be favourable. Considering the international nature of the Group’s activities, 
developments in the world economy will always have an impact on the Group’s activities. The 
improvement in the commercial operating environment has developed more rapid than expected 
in 2005. The price level of Atlantic salmon in the third quarter and so far in the fourth quarter of 
2005 is significantly higher than the average price levels for the same period of 2004. This 
together with a very satisfactory productivity development in the Group’s production gives a 
basis for a continued positive profit performance.  
 
The Group’s vision is to be “the leading, most profitable Norwegian supplier of seafood.” 
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To achieve this, the company states it has to focus on alliances, market orientation, quality, risk 
management and know how. 
 
Conclusion: The Lerøy Group’s vision clearly shows that the company have an ambition of 
being among the best actors in the industry. Their leading position in the Norwegian market is a 
good starting point.  
 
9.2.5 Chance and Government 
 
Government has played an important role for the Lerøy Seafood Group and other fish farming 
industries in the EU- area. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries, several trade 
political. This has limited the companies’ opportunities for chance and growth19. 
 
The fish farming and processing industry in Norway and in the EU is exposed to the risks 
represented by EU’s continued threats of long-term political trade barriers. The EU 
Commission’s decision to implement temporary minimum price on Norwegian salmon is not a 
problem as long as the market price is higher than the politically set minimum price. The EU 
Commission’s decision to implement penal action in order to affect the import of Norwegian 
salmon into the EU market is negative, and is disturbing the global salmon market. The Group 
regrets the EU’s continuing processes against salmon producers in Norway.  
 
Conclusion: Although the EU creates barriers for further growth within the common market, 
new market entrants have arisen in other areas. Lerøy has already established in Russia beside 
several East-Asian countries.  
 
9.2.6 Conclusion on the Diamond Consideration 
 
The discussion above has shown that Norway can be considered as favorable home base of all the 
determinants.  This means that Norway constitutes a solid home base for the fish farm industry. 
19 www.odin.dep.no 
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The home base obviously allows for highly sophisticated knowledge accumulation, it provides 
good feedback on customer preferences and the actors within the industry have a vital attitude 
towards competition.  
 
9.3 Cluster Discussion 
 
Lerøy Seafood Group has a home market where all determinants are present; therefore they have 
specialized in more sophisticated products with help from acquisitions in other countries. 
 
Like Porter (1998a) discusses, a cluster is an alternative way of organizing the value chain. When 
the company started with Hallvard Lerøy as the core business, it saw the need to find new 
markets and develop productivity and innovation. It is obvious that The Lerøy Group has got 
related similarities with a typical cluster. The Group has already expanded its production in the 
domestic market to have the possibility to increase production, thus increasing exports to both old 
and new foreign markets. Further on, a cluster’s restrictions will be defined by the linkages (and 
complementarities) across industries and institutions that are most important to competition. 
Clusters promote both competition and cooperation, but with a static competition, the cluster will 
fail. Competition has to be dynamic and clusters may involve cooperation with other related 
industries and local institutions. The Lerøy Group has for instance managed to cooperate with 
Sweden and Scotland establishing distribution in these countries. 
 
Productivity rests on how companies compete within clusters, and not in the particular field they 
compete in. However, the sophistication with which the companies compete in will be influenced 
by the quality of the local business environment. The Lerøy Group has gained a lot of new know-
how in the new markets, using the host country markets to understand how demand conditions 
are, and try to adapt to these demands. The traditional fish species will no longer be the 
competitive advantage for the industry, but the development and research of new fish farming 
facilities.  
 
First, the Diamond framework implies that clusters affect competition by increasing the 
productivity of companies based in the area, for instance Midnor AS will have a great advantage 
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compared with all the other 350 fish farming facilities situated in the along the Norwegian coast, 
being one of the largest fish farming companies in Norway. Second, Porter states that clusters 
affect competition by driving the direction and speed of innovation, thus strengthening future 
productivity growth. This coincides with Lerøy’s history and choice of action, trying to focus on 
innovation with a wider product range, in addition to the traditional products. Third, clusters 
affect competition by stimulating the formation of new business, which expands and strengthens 
the cluster itself. Hallvard Lerøy developed from being a family owned company to a stock 
market registered company in the expanded Lerøy Group ASA. This has provided the Group with 
venture capital, and made the cluster expand both national and international.  
 
The Lerøy cluster gives better access to employees and suppliers. This is due to the Group’s 
opportunities in the international markets, where it is easier to attract talented people from other 
locations. Formal alliances with distant suppliers will moderate some of the disadvantages of 
distant outsourcing, for instance a large supply of salmon is being sent to China for processing 
filets due to lower costs. The Group could not have accomplished this without the formal 
alliances with China. Additionally, the relationship the Group has got with customers in host 
country markets facilitates the access to specialized information. Trust ties will result in 
transferable information flow.  
 
The competition in the fish farming industry in the home market is highly motivating for the 
company, and the cluster will make it easier to measure and compare performance because the 
local rivals along the Norwegian coast usually share general conditions. Since the Group is 
Norway’s leading exporter of seafood, they differentiate from competitors. The company 
produces, processes, distributes and sells the product, while other Norwegian companies 
normally only have one process they concentrate on.  
 
Sophisticated buyers are often part of a cluster, like the customers who likes sushi which requires 
a mixture of different raw fish, mussels etc. These customers will provide the company inside the 
cluster a better insight on the market than the isolated competitors do. As mentioned in the theory 
description, a cluster will provide the capacity and the flexibility to act rapidly, in addition to 
enhance innovation. When the Lerøy Group relies on distant suppliers, it will face greater 
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challenges because innovation can be harder being a vertically integrated company if it has not 
yet established a good relationship with the new market. A cluster also contributes to new 
business formation because individuals working within the cluster can easily distinguish gaps in 
products or services that may occur, resulting in building new businesses. The Lerøy Group has 
taken advantage of this situation. As Norway is one of the few salmon and other seafood 
producers, the company can extend their product line to satisfy the sophisticated buyers. 
 
9.4 What the Lerøy Group Should do According to the Extended Framework 
 
The focus in this paragraph is to examine which entry strategy The Lerøy Group should choose 
according to the Extended Framework. The cluster analysis relates to motivations and the macro 
factors. 
 
When performing the Diamond-analysis on the Lerøy Group, the findings show that the firm had 
to go abroad to find new markets, and that Norway and the rest of Europe as the main market 
eventually became too small for the ambitious vision. It also shows satisfactory context and 
factor conditions.  
 
Hence, the main motivation for the Lerøy Group for going international is market development. 
Acknowledging that the Lerøy Group is formed as a cluster, the main motivation for going 
international is not the necessity for determinants. Macro factors will set the restrictions for how 
far the company may go. The main motivation for the Group’s international expansion was to 
find new markets. The cluster formation made it possible to expand because Norway and even 
Europe as the main market became too small. Now the company has reached other continents. 
 
Acknowledging Firm Type and Size: The main task at this level of the framework is to decide 
whether or not the Lerøy Group is an MNE.  
 
When deciding whether the Leroy Group is an MNE or not, it is important to understand its 
development from being only a direct exporter of fresh fish, to a WOS situated in several 
continents. Regarding the two criteria for being an MNE, the criterion of active management is 
 
 
 72
                                                          
fulfilled. HQs engage in the active management of their overseas subsidiaries, not only holding 
them as passive financial portfolio.  
 
The second criterion of at least 10% FDI is also covered by The Lerøy Group. Total income in 
the financial year 2004 was NOK 3 559 399 billion, of which only 9% of the total revenue comes 
from the Norwegian market. The Lerøy Group is divided in three departments; sales and 
distributions, production and affiliations. Affiliates are companies in which the Group holds an 
interest of between 20% and 50%, and where investment is long-term and of strategic nature20.  
 
The parent company Lerøy Seafood Group ASA has its main offices in Bergen, Norway. In 
addition to the Group’s managing director the parent company has two employees. 
Administratively, all personnel functions are handled by the wholly owned subsidiary Hallvard 
Lerøy AS. At the end of the year 2004 there were 576 employees in the Group; 379 work in 
Norway and 197 work abroad. This information tells that the Group is an SME according to its 
employee number.  
 
Deciding on Entry Strategy: According to the Extended framework, MNEs should concentrate 
on equity entry modes, i.e. JVs or WOS.  
 
 9.4.1 Conclusion on Extended Framework Actions  
 
When using the extended framework as a tool for deciding entry strategy for the Lerøy Group, 
the main findings is that the firm, as an SME, should pursue equity modes – JV and/or WOS. 
This corresponds well with the main motivations of the Group – Market Development. In theory, 
all entry modes are applicable to market development, but JVs and acquisitions are preferable 
since the Group can share costs and risks with the local partners in the cluster. Most importantly, 
the group will learn from the partner’s knowledge about the host countries. The Group can 
manage a faster entry speed and complete equity and management control if it in particular 
concentrates in expanding with help from acquisitions. All forms of JVs should be applicable as 
equity mode, and acquisitions as the best entry mode for WOS. 
20 www.leroy.no/uploads/LSGAnnualReport2004.pdf 
 
 
Following the extended framework, this is what the Lerøy Group should do: 
 
 
 
Choice of Entry 
Strategy 
Market  
Development 
Host Country  
Factors 
Home Country  
Factors
Host & Home Country Industry Factors 
Equity  
JV 
WOS 
Majority JVs 
Aquisitions 
50/50 JVs 
Minority JVs 
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9.5 What the Lerøy Group Actually Has Done 
 
As in the IKEA – analysis, some of the findings from the previous paragraph will be valid also 
for the Lerøy Group analysis. That is why this section starts with the macro factors.  
 
Considering host country factors the Lerøy Group has prioritized location in Western Europe, but 
the last decade they have expanded to new exotic markets like Asia. When it comes to host 
country risk, they have used a lot of capital in getting to know new markets within different 
cultures. The American market has been a challenge because they belong to a high country risk, 
i.e. low uncertainty avoidance (see Hofstede, 2001). For Lerøy, it has been more complicated 
with establishment in areas where political relations and trade relations have been decisive for the 
choice of host country location. This may be the reason why the Group started offices in EEA – 
countries, then later focusing on long lasting relationship with distant markets in other trade areas 
within WTO. 
 
Referring to the theory discussion, host country factors will have less influence on exporting 
firms because location will not be of the same importance as demand conditions. The Lerøy 
Group has direct export of both sales and distribution. Since location will be more important for 
contractual agreements location, the Group has focused in transmitting knowledge with the host 
countries. Subsidiaries like Hallvard Lerøy will be more dependent on the localization of host 
countries because it operates like a WOS (see annual report).  The responsibility involved is 
large, especially nowadays that the Russian and the American market are sceptical to Norwegian 
salmon (see the part recent events in the Seafood- industry).  
 
Production and affiliations consist in acquisitions and joint ventures in near countries, which 
facilitates the long lasting ties, and institutional similarities. These ties are present to strengthen 
the Group’s production development. Formal alliances with both near and distant markets have 
allowed delivering products of high quality and on developing binding, long term, profitable and 
cost effective collaborations both within suppliers and in the market.  
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Industry Factors: The home country nation is not of high advertising intensity. All advertising 
and capital intensity is operated by the retailers in the host country. It is important for Norway to 
maintain the relationship and commitment with host countries because Norway as a producing 
nation has lost market shares for several years now, and is constantly being challenged by 
countries that provide a much better political framework. Political authorities and others 
determining the conditions under which the Group works, must accept that the industry is global 
and that the companies have to act accordingly (see annual report). 
 
Motivations and firm type are market development and Lerøy Seafood Group is classified as an 
SME, which means that it operates as an MNE, with fewer employees but with active 
management in subsidiaries.  
 
Deciding on Entry Strategy: The Lerøy Group has chosen three different modes of entry; one 
for sales and distribution, one for production and one for affiliated (See appendix 5 for full 
organizational chart).  
 
 9.5.1 Conclusion on Real Actions   
 
This examination has revealed that the Lerøy Group stresses the importance of commitment and 
control over its subsidiaries. Findings show that they have gained new markets, even if it has 
taken some time in the distant HCNs. However, what obstructs the Group from developing new 
markets is the political system in HCNs.  
 
According to the corporate governance (see appendix nr. 5), the company’s history has been 
decisive for how the company is structured today. The reason is that Hallvard Lerøy, now a 
subsidiary within the Group, was established almost 100 years before the Group emerged. This 
implies that the company pride and tradition lies with the main subsidiary instead of the parent 
company.   
 
 
Following the extended framework, this is what the Lerøy Group actually has done: 
 
 
 
Choice of Entry  
Strategy 
Market Development
Host Country 
Factors 
Home Country  
Factors 
Host & Home Country Industry Factors 
Non-Equity  Equtiy 
Exports JV 
WOS 
Direct Exports Minority JVs 
Acquisitions 
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9.6 Comparative Analysis 
  
The findings from the difference between what the Lerøy Group should do and what they actually 
have done seems to be the following; regarding macro factors and equity / non-equity modes. 
Concerning macro factors, Lerøy has chosen different approaches than the theory suggests on 
industry factors. HCNs have taken care of high advertisement intensity factors, with help from 
local retailers. The Lerøy Group’s strong position in the industry is due to the North Atlantic 
seafood cluster. Additionally, The Group’s commitment with HCNs in both EU and WTO has 
facilitated the reach of new customers. 
 
A significant distinction was found at the level of equity / non-equity decision. The extended 
framework suggested only equity-based modes. But since the Lerøy Group has been classified as 
an SME, the company is an exception. The main reason is that the framework may seem a bit too 
rigid on the classification on firm type and size as the main principles for deciding upon equity or 
non-equity strategies. Production and affiliations consist in acquisitions and joint ventures in near 
countries. Long lasting ties and institutional similarities is then of great importance for the 
company’s future international involvement. 
 
The non-equity choice of marketing development can be explained by the brand management of 
Norwegian seafood. The Group’s reputation as being the leading Norwegian seafood company 
has helped retailers in HCNs finding new customer segments in the distant markets. A lot of 
research and development is the explanation of why seafood products have become so popular, 
resulting in a worldwide demand which the Lerøy Group has to keep up with.  
 
 9.7 Scenario Conclusion 
 
The Lerøy Group has focused on direct exports because it has got the know-how in the domestic 
markets. The company is a SME, they focus on direct export for sales and distribution mainly, 
but they also have joint ventures and acquisitions for the production. Findings show that the 
Diamond framework is not good enough because it only applies to MNEs. From the analysis it 
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can be seen that the company does not have a lack of any of the determinants in Porter’s 
diamond. It is more obvious that some of the determinants are not of any crucial importance for 
the business. Since the Lerøy Group has clusters within the fish farming industry, by i.e. settling 
down in Sweden, the company has managed to expand the market. 
 
9.8 Comments on Recent Events in the Seafood Industry 
 
Norwegian sea-food products have in many years had a good reputation abroad, well-known for 
its excellent quality. Recently, this image has been undermined by several assertions questioning 
the quality, in particular on farmed salmon.   
The Russian Federal Agency for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection announced in 
December 2005, that it had introduced temporary restrictions on fish imports from four 
Norwegian fishing enterprises. The 1st of January 2006, a total import - restriction of Norwegian 
farmed salmon were put into practise. The Russian Agriculture Ministry cited excessive pollution 
of the fish as the reason for the prohibition due to asserted high concentrations of lead and 
cadmium. According to hygiene requirements for the safety and nutritional value of food 
products, the discovered concentrations of were not permissible21. A researcher at Norway’s 
NIFES (National Institute of Nutrition and Seafood Research) believes that Russian claims of 
high toxin levels in Norwegian farmed salmon may be correct22. Senior researcher Claudette 
Bethune believes it is likely that the claims of cadmium contamination in Norwegian farmed 
salmon found in Russia can be traced to tainted fish feed in Norway, the Dagbladet newspaper 
reported the 13th of January 2006.  
American researchers share the Russian view on the toxin problem, and suspect Norwegian 
salmon to possibly be carcinogenic and harmful to pregnant women23. These recent events have 
turned out very unfortunate for The Lerøy Group and other Norwegian seafood companies. The 
companies can risk loose its solid market positions in these important markets because their 
brand name and reputation are being associated with health danger and poor quality.   
21 www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=299687 
22 www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2006/01/13/454671.html 
23 www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=112240 
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The Norwegian Government is currently doing its best to solve these threatening issues for the 
sea-food industry, including the Minister of Fishery visiting Russian authorities. The conflict has 
in the beginning of March 2006 still not been solved.  
X. Scenario III 
 
This scenario differs from the two previous because it does not engage in a Diamond analysis or 
the Extended framework for identifying entry strategies. Instead the success of Dell is analyzed 
and explained according to the Born Global Concept and characteristics of e-commerce.  
 
As stated above in chapter 4.3, the connection between the Diamond framework, the Double 
Diamond framework and the Born Global Concept can be viewed as a development from focus 
on nations, via regions, to a worldwide approach. Porter (1998b) assumes that firms consolidate 
their home markets before going international, emphasizing the role of home nations in the 
internationalization process. Born Globals, at the other hand, are companies that already at the 
start-up define their target areas as the key markets of the world. These firms typically do not 
depend on a strong home market, and therefore, the Diamond framework is not applicable.  
 
10.1 Case – Dell Computer Corporation 
 
Dell Computer Corporation is a premier provider of products and services required for customers 
worldwide to build their information-technology and Internet infrastructures. Dell, through its 
direct business model, designs, manufactures and customizes products and services to customer 
requirements, and offers an extensive selection of software and peripherals. The company’s climb 
to market leadership is the result of a persistent focus on delivering the best possible customer 
experience by directly selling standards-based computing products and services. Revenue for the 
last four quarters totalled $54.2 billion and the company employs approximately 63,700 team 
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members around the globe.24 B2B counts for approximately 85% of total sale, while B2C has the 
last 15%.25
 
Dell was founded in 1984 by Michael Dell, at that time only 18 years of age. This makes him the 
computer industry's longest-tenured chief executive officer and a visionary leader. Much of the 
company’s success can be traced back to its founder, who early saw the opportunities in e-
commerce as logical supplement to a direct model.  
 
The direct model eliminates retailers which add unnecessary time and cost to the value-chain. It 
allows the company to sell directly to the customer. The advantages are many. First, Dell can 
introduce the latest relevant technology faster than competitors with slow-moving, indirect 
distribution channels, turning over inventory every four days on average.26 Second, direct contact 
with its customers allows Dell to customize all computers and systems exactly to the customers’ 
preferences, i.e. the customers get a tailor-suited computer to a lower price than other 
manufacturers can offer. And third, dealing directly with suppliers minimises costs (i.e. the JIT-
concept). In other words, it is because of the direct model Dell has been able to grow so rapidly, 
and capture the position as one of the leading manufacturer worldwide.   
 
Dell expanded into a worldwide MNE by using a selective expansion; the direct model was 
introduced country by country. A basis assumption was that all countries in the world accept the 
direct model given the right time and market maturation. 
 
Dell's corporate headquarters are located in Round Rock, Texas, which is the company's 
birthplace. Central Texas is also the home to Dell Americas, the regional business unit for the 
United States, Canada, South America and Latin America. Dell also has regional headquarters in 
Europe (England), Middle East, Africa and in Singapore, which is supposed to serve the Pacific 
Rim, including Japan, India, China, Australia and New Zealand. Besides the regional 
headquarters, Dell also has several production sites around the globe: 3 in the US, one in Brazil, 
one in Ireland, one in Malaysia and one in China.  
24 www.dell.com 
25 Maguire, James, Case study at North Carolina State University 2006 http://ditialenterprise.org 
26 See appendix page x for Dell’s Direct Model 
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10.2 Analysis DELL –related to the Born Global Concept 
 
Looking at the definition of the Born Global Concept, it is clear that Dell can be labelled a Born 
Global. Dell started exporting already after three years when establishing its first overseas 
subsidiary in the UK. The annual report from the FY 2005 confirms that over 30% of the net 
revenue is from export outside the Americas.27 This satisfies the conditions for a Born Global 
classification as having an export percentage of 25% or more.  
 
According to the Born Global Concept, the founder has a very strong impact on the formation of 
the company and its performance. This also goes for Dell. In 1983, at the age of 18 and with US 
$1,000, Michael Dell realized his life ambition and started out selling upgraded PCs and 
components from his dormitory room at the University of Texas, Houston. The dorm-room sales 
practice officially became Dell Computer Corporation in May 1984. With the rapid growth of the 
company, Dell went public in June 1988. Ten years later, Dell was ranked number two and the 
fastest growing among all major computer systems companies worldwide, with more than 26,000 
employees around the globe. Michael Dell earned the reputation of being the youngest CEO ever 
of a Fortune 500 company. Without this visionary leader, the company could not become an 
MNE after only 15 years. These facts illustrate how crucial Michael Dell has been to the 
company’s expansion.  
 
The Born Global Concept also discusses the importance of considering the networks in which its 
founder(s) is active during the founding period. Michael Dell was early on anticipating the great 
potential the Internet had and was the first to start online-sales of computers.  
 
10.3 DELL Analysis – related to E-commerce 
 
Dell taking its business activities online can be viewed as a logical extension to the direct model, 
making it even more direct. The result was the launching of the site www.dell.com in 1994. From 
1996, customers could configure and order a computer directly through the website, and it was 
27 www.dell.com/downloads/global/corporate/annual/2005_dell_annual.pdf 
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the first computer company to provide a comprehensive on-line purchasing tool. Dell’s 
application of Internet technology to its direct model created a fully integrated value chain. It 
allowed a three-way “information partnership” with suppliers and customers by treating each 
player as a collaborator to improve efficiency across the entire supply and demand chain, thus 
sharing the benefits. 
 
The online business has turned out very successful, and the direct model has been widely used in 
marketing classes as the core example of e-commerce.  A large profit source for the firm is the 
B2B model. While Dell's consumer sales are highly visible, in part due to a high profiled TV 
campaign, its business sales are a much bigger revenue source. "About 15 percent of our total 
revenue is consumer business and the rest is B2B. Our major focus in the IT marketplace is 
selling servers, storage products, network switches and services to corporate customers. A lot of 
the e-commerce engine revolves around that."28  
 
To facilitate B2B sales, the Dell site offers each corporate customer an individualized interface. 
Using what Dell calls a Premier page, purchasing managers log on and order using an interface 
customized for their company's needs. They place the order, it gets routed up to whoever in their 
firm needs to approve it, and then the order is sent directly to the firm. The efficiency of the B2B 
system works in synergy with the consumer sales. Corporate customers are also consumers, so if 
they have a good experience, they can buy a system for their home, or vice versa. 
 
But while this trend so far has turned out well for Dell, the B2C segment is showing signs of 
reaching the saturation point. Besides, second hand sales of computers now constitute a growing 
market share. Auction sites like eBay and uBid are enjoying thriving growth rates in PC sales, in 
contrast to new PC vendors like Dell.  
 
The traditional approach to innovation tends to produce proprietary technologies and products 
that are often hard to migrate from as a customer. In contrast, Dell has a more open and effective 
approach to R&D. Dell innovation starts with customers. The company gathers requirements 
directly through tens of thousands of customer interactions daily, organized events, and customer 
28 Interview with Dell Management: Case Study, James Maguire. 
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panels. These requirements drive Dell technology initiatives, innovations, and product directions. 
Additionally, The R&D is effective. Dell products may be developed in house or by working 
closely with strategic partners. Customer feedback throughout this cycle reinforces Dell's focus 
on relevant technologies that address real customer requirements. Dell also practices an open 
innovation strategy. Dell R&D organizations steer enabling industry standards and technologies 
through industry groups and strategic partners, and develop innovative, non-proprietary, open 
standards-based products. 
 
But it is not only the customers who benefit; the firms also gain advantages from the internet, 
particular in the field of marketing and customer feedback. The web and its search engines give 
firms a way to be found by customers without expensive, national advertising. Even small actors 
can reach a global market. Web technologies also allow merchants to track customer preferences 
and produce individually tailored products. Here Dell will be an excellent example of how to do 
good e-business. By online orders directly from its customers, Dell is able to deliver a computer 
exactly made by the customer’s demand. And by shipping it directly to the recipient, they 
significantly shorten the value chain and, hence, are able to cut prices and offer a very up to date 
PC.  
 
10.3.1 Conclusion on the Born Global and E-Commerce Consideration 
 
It has been demonstrated that Dell has not developed its international activities in time 
consuming processes starting in cultural homogenous areas and expanding to further distant 
markets. Instead, Dell has followed the internationalization patterns of the Born Globals, using 
the internet and e-commerce activities as tools to gain its leading market position.  
 
10.4 Scenario Conclusion 
 
The analysis of Dell has shown how the firm gained its success from rapid international growth 
and the use of e-commerce, i.e. making country borders less important. Porter (2001) himself has 
argued that online business makes country borders less important. Hence, the very foundation of 
the Diamond falls apart. Further, this also proves that the Diamond assumption of home base 
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location is no longer being of any significance. For Dell and other firms which early engage in 
international business activities, case scenario 3 has shown that the Born Global Concept may be 
better suited to explain firm success than the Diamond framework.  
 
XI. Critical Reflections and Further Research 
 
When applying the Extended framework on the scenario cases, in general, two weaknesses 
became apparent. The first regards the lack of flexibility within the framework. The decision to 
let equity and non-equity modes depend on firm type seemed reasonable because it provided the 
framework with clear lines of decision hierarchy. However, as the framework was applied on the 
cases, it soon became evident that the framework was unable to deal with the complexity and 
diversity of options pursued in real life actions. For further research we suggest that the decision 
of equity / non-equity modes should be dependent on other variables than just firm type.  
 
The other difficulty relates to time perspective. The Extended framework assumes a 
chronological time perspective. That is, the parent company should establish in the home market 
before they settle down in distant markets with their subsidiaries. The core capabilities, skills and 
knowledge often accumulate with years of experience. It can easily create confusions on what is 
to be considered as the corporation’s main activities, the ones of the parent company or of the 
main subsidiary. Case scenario 2 shows such an opposite chronology, as The Lerøy Seafood 
Group was established almost 100 years after its main subsidiary, Hallvard Lerøy AS. 
  
Finally, some statements regarding sources and the use of references are needed. The number of 
articles the thesis rests on can be perceived as too narrow. Ideally, it would be appreciated with 
some more support based on research and publications. However, not much literature was found 
on the issues regarding entry strategies and the connections to the competitive advantages of 
nations.  
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XII. Concluding Remarks 
 
The contribution of this thesis has been to connect Porter’s Diamond Framework to entry 
strategies. An extended framework has been developed as a tool to help firms adopting the most 
sufficient entry strategy.  
 
The internationalization process has been presented with the following stages; the starting point 
is the motivational factor, followed by the Diamond-analysis to decide if reasons for expanding 
into foreign markets exist. If the reasons exist, a proper entry strategy should be chosen to secure 
a firmly establishment. Once the subsidiary is established, the challenge is to consolidate the 
market position.  
 
Four questions is raised in the literature; why (firm motivations), how (entry strategy), when 
(timing) and where (macro factors). The thesis has discussed the how, with contributions from 
why and partly where. When has not been discussed. 
 
Entry strategies were linked to the Diamond-framework by examining the influencing variables 
on both entry strategies and the Diamond. The variables identified were on macro level (country- 
and firm specific) as well as firm level, including political arrangements, judicial systems, human 
capital, risk orientation and more. These are variables discussed by Porter when explaining the 
Diamond Framework, i.e. a connection exists. 
 
The connection is illustrated in the design of the Extended framework, which is based on the 
Hierarchical Model by Pan and Tse (2000). The Extended framework consists of the following 
variables; choice of entry strategy, macro factors, firms motivations, equity/non-equity choice, 
main category of entry strategy and subcategory of entry strategy. The added features to the 
framework are macro factors and firm motivations. The framework has a hierarchical structure, 
implying that the number of options is narrowed as the hierarchy levels are followed downwards. 
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The connection to the Diamond framework goes through the firm motivation level; it is the 
outcome of the Diamond analysis which is decisive for firm motivations. Also, a section on 
academic criticism of the Porter Diamond is included, emphasizing the Double Diamond 
Framework by Rugman and D’Cruz (1993) and the Born Global Concept by Rasmussen and 
Madsen (2002). 
 
The Extended framework has been applied to case-scenario 1 and 2, while the alternative theory 
on the Diamond was applied to case-scenario 3. The findings showed that the Extended 
framework has an average capability to predict suitable entry strategies. The weakness is mainly 
due to the choice of pursuing either on equity or non-equity mode, while the analysis of the 
firm’s real actions showed that MNEs / SMEs often engage in both types. 
 
The findings on scenario 3 strengthen the assumption that the Diamond framework is not 
applicable to all industries. E-commerce and the early international approach used by many firms 
nowadays, do not apply to the Diamond framework context of a strong consolidated home market 
as the foundation for international activities.  
 
For further research proposals, it is suggested that the Extended framework needs to be modified 
to be able to deal with more complex strategies of foreign market entry.  
 
 
 87
References 
 
 
Bartlett, Christopher A. / Nanda, Aisha: Ingvar Kamprad and IKEA, Harvard Business School 
case 390-132, 1990 
 
Bartlett, Christopher A. / Ghoshal, Sumantra / Birkinshaw, Julian: Transnational Management: 
Text, Cases, and Readings in Cross-Border Management, McGraw-Hill, Boston 2004 
 
Björk, Stellan: IKEA – Entreprenøren – Forretningsideen – Kulturen. Index Publishing AS,  
Oslo 2000 
 
Cartwright, W.R.: Multiple linked “diamonds” and the international competitiveness of export-
dependent industries: the New Zealand experience, Management International Review, 2, 55-70, 
1993 
 
Davis, Peter S. / Desai, Ashay B. / Francis, John D.: Mode of International Entry: An 
Isomorphism Perspective, Journal of International Business Studies, 31, 2 (Second Quarter), 
2000 
 
Dunning, John H.: Internationalizing Porter’s Diamond, Management International Review, 
Special Issue 2, 1993 
 
Dunning, John H.: The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories of 
MNE activity, International Business Review, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2000 
 
Ellis, Paul: Social Ties and Foreign Market Entry, Journal of International Business Studies, 31, 
3 (Third Quarter), 2000 
 
Gooderham, Paul N. / Nordhaug, Odd: International Management – Cross-Boundary Challenges, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003 
 
 
 88
 
Hill, Charles / W.L.: International Business: Competing in the Global Marketplace, Int.ed., 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin 5th edition, 2005 
 
Hofstede, G.: Culture's Consequences. London: Sage Publications. 2nd ed. 2001, Ch. 1 
(Values and culture, pp. 1–40, compendium in INB403) 
 
Javala, Jukka / Pohjola, Matti: Economic Growth in the New Economy: Evidence from Advanced 
Economies, Elsevier Science, 2002 
 
Jijang, Ruihua Joy: Entry Strategies and Subsequent Foreign Expansion Path, Academy of 
Management Best Conference Paper, 2005 
 
Keillor, Bruce / Davila, Victor / Hult, Tomas: Market Entry Strategies and Influencing Factors: 
A multi-industry/multi-product investigation, The Marketing Management Journal. Vol.11, Issue 
2, 2001 
 
Kotabe, Masaaki / Helsen, Kristiaan: Global Marketing Management, second.ed., John Wiley & 
Sons Inc. New York 2001  
 
Lasserre, Philippe: Global Strategic Management, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2003 
 
Laudon, Kennth C. / Laudon, Jane P.: Essentials of Management Systems – Managing the Digital 
Firm, 5th edition, Prentice Hall, 2003 
 
Lovelock, Pauline Ng. P. / Farhoomand, Ali F.: Dell; Selling Directly, Globally, University of 
Hong Kong 2000 
 
Madsen, Tage K. / Rasmussen, Erik S. / Servais, P.: Differences and similarities between Born 
Globals and other types of exporters, Advances in International Marketing, vol. 10, 2000 
 
 
 
 89
Malhotra, Naresh K. / Agarwal, James / Ulgado, Francis M: Internationalization and Entry 
Modes: A Multitheoretical Framework and Research Propositions, Journal of International 
Marketing. Vol.11, No.4, 2003 
 
Moen, Øystein / Servais, Per: Born Global or Gradual Global? Examining the Export Behaviour 
of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Journal of International Marketing, vol.10, No.3, 2002 
 
O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas: The Idea of Competitive Advantage and the Ideas of Michael Porter, 
Strategic Change, Vol.6, John Wiley & Sons, 1997 
 
Pan, Yigang / Tse, David K.: The Hierarchical Model of Market Entry Modes, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 31, 4 (4th Quarter), 2000. 
 
Parsons, June Jamrich / Oja, Dan: New Perspectives on Computer Consepts, 8th edition, Thomson 
Course Technology, 2006 
 
Peng, Mike W.: Global Strategy, int.ed, South-Western, 2006 
 
Porter, Michael E: Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, Harvard Business Review, 
1998 
 
Porter, Michael E.: The Competitive Advantage of Nations: with a new introduction, Macmillan 
Business, 1998  
 
Porter, Michael E.: The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Harvard Business Review, March-
April 1990 
 
Porter, Michael E.: Strategy and the Internet, Harvard Business Review, March 2001 
 
Rasheed, Howard S.: Foreign Entry Mode and Performance: The Moderating Effects of 
Environment, Journal of Small Business Management. Vol.43, No.1, 2005 
 
 
 90
 
Rasmussen, E /Madsen, T..: The Born Global Concept, Paper for the EIBA conference, 
University of Southern Denmark, 2002 
 
Rodriguez, Peter / Uhlenbruck, Klaus / Eden, Lorraine: Government Corruption and the Entry 
Strategies of Multinationals, Academy of Management Review. Vol.30, No.2, 2005 
 
Rugman, Alan M. / D’Cruz, Joseph R.: The “Double Diamond” Model of International 
Competitiveness: The Canadian Experience, Management International Review, Special Issue 2, 
1993 
 
Rugman, Alan M. / Verbeke, Alain: Foreign Subsidiaries and Multinational Strategic 
Management: An Extension and Correction of Porter’s Single Diamond Framework, 
Management International Review, Special Issue 2, 1993 
 
Servais, Per / Rasmussen Erik S / Nielsen Bo B. / Madsen, Tage K.: Internationalization of 
Danish SMEs, Paper from the Reference Book on European Entrepreneurship which is to be 
published in 2006 by Edward Elgar. 
 
Zhan, Sherrie E.: Choosing a Market Entry Strategy, World trade, 1999 
 
Websites: 
 
www.dagbladet.no
www.dell.com
www.godfisk.no
http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com
www.ikea.no
www.ikea-group.ikea.com
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/students/hs/think/lesson6.pdf
www.imf.org/external/pubs/WEOMAY/02ADVAN.HTM 
 
 
 91
www.leroy.no
www.odin.dep.no
www.vg.no
  
 
 
 Appendix 
 
Appendix no. 1 
 Source: Lasserre, Philippe: Global Strategic Management, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2003 
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Appendix no. 2 
 
 
Source: Madsen & Rasmussen, 2002: ”The Born Global Concept” 
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Appendix no. 3 
Figure: Dell’s Build-to-customer Order 
 
 
Kitting 
Based on the Traveller, all internal parts and components required to make the 
system are picked and placed into a tote 
Build-to-Order 
A team of workers uses the kit to assemble and initially test the entire system 
Testing and System Integration 
Systems are then extensively tested using Dell diagnostics. Standard or custom 
hardware and software is factory installed and tested 
 
Boxing, Shipping and Delivery 
The build-to-order cycle takes less than five hours from start to finish 
Custom-Designed Computers 
The traveller is a sheet that contains all of the customer’s unique configuration 
information. This document travels with the system throughout its assembly 
and shipping 
Just-in-time Inventory 
Dell receives only the materials it is immediately ready to use and only those 
specified as desirable to that particular customer 
Start Here with the customer 
Dell customers communicate and buy from Dell in three ways: 
www.dell.com        Voice-to-voice    Face-to-face 
 
 
Source: Pauline NG, 2000 Centre for Asian Business Cases. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong 
(Originally from Dell’s homepage www.dell.com) 
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Appendix no. 4             Source:www.ikea.com 
 
 
Appendix no. 5 
 
 
Source: Annual report 2004, Lerøy Seafood Group ASA 
 
 
Appendix no. 6 
                   Source: Annual report 2004, Lerøy Seafood Group ASA 
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